Not every cloud has a silver lining – but Trump’s recent tariff hike on Chinese aluminum products, combined with the rollout of carbon border adjustment mechanisms in other major export markets, has created a strong financial incentive for this energy-intensive industry to accelerate its long-overdue green transition. Constant concerns over the security of raw material supplies only add to the urgency, pushing the sector to fast-track its shift in production processes. By tapping into China’s extensive non-ferrous metal recycling system, the industry can adopt shorter, lower-emission production routes based on recycled scrap.

China’s primary aluminum production emits more CO2 than the entire country of Indonesia. Chinese regulators have long classified aluminum manufacturing as a “dual-high” sector – high in energy consumption and emissions – alongside coal power, steel, and chemicals. Over the past decade, the sector has relied on the abundant, low-cost hydropower in China’s southwest to reduce its energy and carbon footprints. However, as Yunyou cautions, hydropower – once seen as a quick fix for the sector’s emissions problem – is no longer a reliable long-term solution.

To seize this decarbonization window, the sector must address the elephant in the room: its heavy dependence on outdated, inefficient, and often small-scale captive coal power plants. Built mostly in the early 2000s, these plants have long provided aluminum producers with cheap and stable electricity – but at a significant environmental cost. As Yunyou argues, phasing out the least efficient captive plants and retrofitting some for greater efficiency and flexibility could immediately curb the sector’s rising emissions and stay on track with China’s national carbon peaking goals.

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Analysis: Why Trump’s Tariffs Are a Green Opportunity for Chinese Aluminum

Decarbonizing aluminum offers China a win-win solution for the climate crisis and geopolitical uncertainties.

By Yunyou Chen

Edited by Hongqiao Liu and Kevin Schoenmakers

China’s aluminum industry has a tariff problem. The country produces 60% of the world’s primary aluminum and is the world’s largest exporter of aluminum products. According to custom data, about 15% of those exports are going to the U.S. But, the recent U.S. tariff hike puts a steep 25% tariff on Chinese aluminum.

Moreover, the industry’s heavy reliance on imported bauxite – its key raw material – leaves it vulnerable to trade disruptions. China’s aluminum industry used to source mainly from Malaysia and Indonesia, but after those countries banned mining and restricted exports, it now predominantly sources from Guinea and Australia. Any supply interruptions would cause significant economic damage to the many industries in China that use aluminum for their products.

However, these geopolitical tensions also present an opportunity. The aluminum industry is carbon-intensive, emitting around 5% of the country’s total greenhouse gases. China has yet to establish an official decarbonization roadmap for the aluminum sector, but experts from the Non-Ferrous Metal Association optimistically anticipate that carbon emissions will peak this year. Decarbonizing the sector would not only contribute to China’s dual carbon climate goals but also minimize the climate impact of clean energy products that use aluminum, such as solar and wind power plants, transmission and distribution grids, and electric vehicles.

China could turn the American tariff challenge into a green opportunity. The new import barriers will reshape global trade flows, and allow the Chinese aluminum sector to redirect its trade with the U.S. to more climate-conscious markets such as Australia, the U.K., and Southeast Asian countries. These are among China’s top destinations for aluminum products today and also have mechanisms favorable to decarbonization. For instance, Australia is reviewing the feasibility of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Thailand is drafting a climate change bill incorporating CBAM, and the U.K. plans to implement its own CBAM by 2027. These emerging carbon border policies, which impose levies on products with high carbon footprints, could incentivize Chinese aluminum companies to continue lowering their emissions.

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One way to cut emissions would be shifting to more circular production processes that use recycled scrap. This would also allow the Chinese aluminum sector to reduce its dependence on imported bauxite. Scrap-based aluminum making – or secondary aluminum production – avoids energy-intensive processes such as alumina refining and aluminum smelting, and could lower emissions by over 95%.

There is a growing supply of recyclable resources. China is experiencing a surge in end-of-life vehicles and building materials such as aluminum facades, roofs, and doors. Yet, recycling capacity remains insufficient to fully tap into this potential. As a result, despite the abundance of scrap and its substantial emissions savings potential, recycled aluminum still accounts for less than 30% of total input.

Apart from shifting to a more circular aluminum production process, China’s aluminum sector must cut its reliance on coal. Smelting, which consumes 7% of the nation’s electricity, relies on coal for 70% of its power supply – 12 percentage points higher than the national average.

Today, many Chinese aluminum companies operate their own so-called captive coal plants to power their smelting facilities. Their total capacity is 80 GW, or 6% of China’s total installed coal power capacity. In top-producing provinces like Shandong, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, smelters rely almost entirely on these captive plants. Despite ongoing retrofit efforts, over half of this capacity still runs on inefficient subcritical combustion and often lacks basic emission controls like dust removal, desulfurization, or denitrification.

Phasing out captive coal, repurposing plants for backup and grid flexibility, or replacing them with onsite renewables could yield major emissions cuts. According to Transition Asia’s estimates, captive coal plants accounted for nearly 75% of aluminum smelting’s electricity-related emissions in 2021. Without deep retrofits or fuel switching, the emissions from these plants could not peak for another 15 to 20 years, even as the sector achieves carbon footprint reductions elsewhere.

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In response to China’s strict dual-control policy aimed at reducing energy use and intensity, many aluminum smelters have relocated to Yunnan over the past decade, attracted by its cheaper and cleaner hydropower. China Hongqiao Group, the country’s second-largest aluminum producer, has moved over 60% of its smelting capacity there. However, hydropower is no longer a reliable long-term decarbonization solution for the sector. Climate change-driven droughts have increasingly disrupted production, as the reduced hydropower output is prioritized to meet essential public needs, such as residential and agricultural use.

Looking ahead, stronger policy signals can further accelerate the aluminum industry’s green transition. In recent years, China has introduced measures aimed at cutting emissions, improving energy efficiency, and promoting cleaner energy use in aluminum production. The National Development and Reform Commission – the state planner – has set minimum green electricity usage targets for aluminum smelting by province for 2024 and 2025.

Stricter environmental regulations are also raising the cost of coal-fired power, incentivizing smelters to seek cleaner and more affordable power sources and reduce their consumption. For instance, the tiered electricity pricing system introduced in 2013 imposed higher electricity rates on companies, such as smelters, with higher electricity intensity.

China’s power sector Emissions Trading System (ETS) already covers most captive coal plants, and the recent inclusion of the aluminum sector signals growing carbon costs, particularly for small and outdated smelters. However, to become a true game-changer, the ETS must evolve to reward low-carbon producers and penalize high-carbon ones, setting stricter benchmarks, and moving toward an auction based system for allowances.

China’s abundant green resources and rapidly-evolving green technologies present significant decarbonization opportunities for the aluminium sector. Perhaps the current international trade turbulence could be the push it needs to adopt them.

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With a career spanning roles at the nonprofit environmental communication center GRID-Arendal and the United Nations Environment Programme in Europe and Africa, Otto co-founded Zoï 16 years ago to make environmental information accessible and compelling for decision-makers and the public.

I first encountered Zoï a few years ago at a UN conference on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). There, Otto introduced me to the concept of environmental and social safeguards, a pragmatic approach that functions less as an aspirational best practice and more as a crucial safety net. Acting as a shield, these safeguards help to balance urgent infrastructure needs with long-term sustainability.

Infrastructure connectivity through roads and railways facilitates access to essential services like healthcare and education, which are critical for adapting to climate change and building resilience, particularly in the world’s most vulnerable mountain communities. Meanwhile, BRI infrastructure projects have long faced criticism for contributing to debt crises, ecological degradation, and inadequate engagement with local communities, as extensively documented by researchers and institutions.

Over the past decade, sustained engagement from activists and advocacy groups has pushed Chinese development banks, corporations, and industry associations to gradually – though imperfectly – integrate environmental and social policies into their practices. China is also increasingly embracing the “small yet beautiful” approach in future BRI projects, shifting away from large-scale infrastructure projects. While this transition serves China’s strategic interests and contributes to global climate action, its gradual retreat is widening an already substantial funding gap.

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Essay: How a ‘Smaller and Greener’ BRI Could Leave Vulnerable Mountain Communities Behind

China’s Belt and Road initiative has improved connectivity in the world’s mountain regions. To continuously boost climate resiliency, infrastructure finance is key.

By Dr. Otto Simonett

Edited by Hongqiao Liu and Kevin Schoenmakers

Every summer, I escape Geneva and retreat to the serene mountains of Grisons in eastern Switzerland, better known to the world as the site of the Davos World Economic Forum. There, my brother and I share an old cabin perched on a ridge overlooking the Schams Valley. This cabin, worn by 100 years of sunshine, snow, and storms, including the mountains’ Foehn winds, has become my sanctuary.

Reaching this remote hideaway is easier than you’d expect. Switzerland’s efficient public transportation allows me to blend into the wilderness within a few hours. Isolated, my days are spent reading, hiking, cooking meals on the wood-fired stove, and reconnecting with nature. But modern conveniences are never far: we have clean water, stable electricity, and a smart webcam that provides live weather conditions and forecasts.

But mountainous areas in many other countries aren’t so lucky. All together, the globe’s mountains are home to over a billion people and provide vital resources – such as freshwater, biodiversity, and recreation – for billions more downstream. However, their remoteness and limited access to markets and services often leave local mountain communities facing higher poverty rates and slower development compared to lowland areas.

China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative, the BRI, started some 12 years ago and provided severely needed funding for infrastructure projects in mountainous areas. These include a highway connecting Montenegro with Serbia, and a highway connecting Central Asia’s Fergana Valley – shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – with China. Given mountain regions’ compounded challenges, the countries embraced these developments with general enthusiasm.

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The benefits of these projects can be transformative: reduced travel times, expanded cargo capacities, improved access to essential services, and more trade and other economic opportunities. Better and modern infrastructure also reduces disruptions from natural disasters, can contribute to more efficient energy use, and provide alternative income sources such as tourism. In the last decade, BRI projects improved the transportation networks in several mountain regions of the world.

But these projects came with environmental concerns. Since 2009, my team at the Zoï Environment Network, a nonprofit dedicated to making environmental information appealing and accessible, has focused on enhancing awareness of climate and environmental issues across the world’s mountainous regions. These areas are on the front lines of climate change, with accelerated warming, glacier retreat, and more frequent natural disasters.

Infrastructure project development in mountain regions, with their sensitive ecosystems and implications for downstream regions, requires high environmental scrutiny. The planned Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China highway will cross the Mountains of Central Asia biodiversity hotspot at high elevations of 2,500-3,000 meters. At this altitude, climate change has already impacted the mountain permafrost, rock, and soil stability and the safety of mines. The almost completed new strategic North-South road in Kyrgyzstan is essential for ensuring connectivity and economic security in parts of the country. But it may also bring more and new environmental pressures to the fragile mountain ecosystems.

Ensuring the environmental safety and sustainability of large-scale infrastructure is critical. Thoughtful planning can help avoid the risks of long-term debt and stranded assets and manage the environmental footprint associated with construction and operation. For instance, the above-mentioned China-built highway in Montenegro for the time being leads to “nowhere,” waiting for a missing bit connecting it to Serbia. And, the existing construction has already damaged parts of the UNESCO-protected Tara river banks. Better coordination between the countries and taking into account basic environmental safeguards could have prevented the current situation.

Applying robust safeguards, and implementing climate-resilient – or “climate-proof” – approaches can protect both the environment and local economies. This involves integrating climate impact scenarios into the planning and design of roads, railways, and other infrastructure.

While these practices are standard in some regions and are used by the international development banks, they are often overlooked in remote mountain areas, where climate considerations, transparency, and community concerns are less integrated into planning. Mountain regions have more complex climates and higher natural disaster risks than lowland areas, and their communities are not of primary concern to decision makers.

With the BRI, an important funding source for infrastructure projects in developing countries, pivoting toward supporting smaller, greener, and “beautiful” projects like clean technology, the substantial financing gap further widened. In the 12 years of its existence, cumulative BRI investment in infrastructure was $679 billion world-wide. But annual spending had already started to decline in 2017. It is unknown who may fill this investment gap, in particular in remote and poor mountain communities. The U.S. already spent way less than China on such projects, and seems even less willing to invest abroad under the second Trump administration.

In Switzerland, my home country, many people take our convenient, affordable public transport and high-speed internet for granted. We sometimes forget how profoundly connectivity impacts people’s lives and economic development – provided that environmental and social safeguards are applied and that public and eco-friendly transport options are prioritized. If our existing easy access to connectivity should teach us anything, it is not to judge too critically when we see new large infrastructure projects elsewhere in the world, but to realize that all mountain communities should enjoy the prosperity that connectivity brings.

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Angel, who was recently named a Lead Author for the upcoming IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Cities, shared during a recent public panel that her own academic work has already taken a hit from the Trump administration’s relentless attacks on climate science and public institutions.

Having been an active participant in Track II dialogues between non-state actors, she has closely witnessed the ups and downs of U.S.-China climate cooperation. Speaking from her experience, Angel argues that businesses, local governments, academia, and civil society – who “saved the day” during Trump’s first term – must step up. Amid Trump’s sweeping efforts to reject climate actions, they need to employ even greater creativity to sustain momentum and drive climate cooperation between the world’s two largest carbon-emitting countries.

It’s easy to conclude that, without sustained and strengthened subnational cooperation, the U.S. stands to lose. But clearly, there’s no winner should the situation continue to deteriorate. The next U.S.-China High-Level Event on Subnational Climate Action will be held in China. As Angel warns, if U.S. subnational actors, out of fear for political repercussions, choose to avoid attending, the U.S.-China relationship would lose a rare oasis of cooperation in its desert of distrust.

China’s businesses and cities would miss a valuable opportunity to renew their commitments and rebuild confidence, especially as the latest Chinese Government Work Report once again sidelines environmental and climate targets. And Chinese academia and civil society – already constrained by tightening restrictions on international collaboration – would lose crucial platforms to showcase their work and build connections.

I hope you enjoy this edition of the newsletter. Remember to read our special roundtable on the U.S., China, and climate in Trump 2.0. If you’d like to write for us, drop us an email at contact@shuangtan.me.

Analysis: How the U.S. and China Can Continue Fighting Climate Change Despite Trump

As Trump aggressively rejects climate action, U.S.-China climate collaboration once again falls onto the shoulders of companies, academia, and local governments.

By Angel Hsu, PhD

Edited by Hongqiao Liu and Kevin Schoenmakers

On November 15, 2023, Presidents Xi Jinping and Joe Biden walked through the famed Filoli Garden near San Francisco, their smiles symbolizing a warmer, more optimistic phase in U.S.-China relations on climate change. A few days earlier, their respective climate envoys had brokered a broad bilateral agreement on climate cooperation called the Sunnylands Statement.

Fast forward nearly two years, and this sunny image feels distant. Donald J. Trump, now back in office, has withdrawn the United States from the Paris Agreement for the second time and paused billions of dollars in clean energy funding allocated through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Escalating tariffs and retaliatory measures between the U.S. and China have further strained relations, severely undermining prospects for future dialogue or collaboration. And the Sunnylands Statement, once a milestone marking the resumption of U.S.-China climate cooperation after a yearlong freeze in bilateral climate dialogue following Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, has since been archived from the U.S. State Department’s website.

During Trump’s first term, subnational actors – city and regional governments, businesses, and universities – stepped up to fill the void left by federal disengagement. Facing even stronger setbacks this time around, will a new, reinvigorated bottom-up movement emerge to sustain and advance climate action in the world’s two biggest greenhouse gas emitters?

Subnationals saved the day during Trump 1.0

History offers a glimmer of hope. Under the first Trump administration, the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement galvanized a countercurrent to federal climate inaction. Nearly 4,000 American mayors, governors, business leaders, and academic institutions rallied under the “We Are Still In” movement. Their climate pledges and actions – varying from scaling up renewable energy to capacity building – were able to sustain momentum and led to emission reduction despite the lack of federal climate policy.

They also demonstrated the power of decentralized climate diplomacy. A key moment was the 2018 Global Climate Action Summit, hosted by then-California Governor Jerry Brown and former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. The summit saw one of the largest overseas Chinese delegations, including Chinese policymakers, provincial and municipal representatives, NGOs, and academics, engage in climate collaboration with their U.S. counterparts. California and Chinese partners reached over a dozen Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) during the summit, along with a surge of corporate commitments. Brown’s subsequent visit to China further underscored the pivotal role of subnational governments in sustaining international climate cooperation.

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Even when the Biden administration resumed diplomatic relations with China on climate change, subnational governments’ continuous efforts acted as neutral territory for collaboration amid rising geopolitical tensions. The Sunnylands Statement highlighted their special role, emphasizing the importance of city- and region-level partnerships for advancing climate action, particularly in areas where Chinese companies and local governments have been leading, including offshore wind development, EV adoption, and charging infrastructure.

California Governor Gavin Newsom, San Francisco Mayor Breed, and a bipartisan delegation of mayors from the Mississippi River Delta all traveled to China in 2023. In May 2024, the California-China Climate Institute convened another summit, fulfilling the Sunnylands commitment to hold the first U.S.-China High-level Event on Subnational Climate Action.

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Is another ‘We Are Still In’ moment possible?

Today, the “We Are Still In” movement, rebranded as the “America Is All In” coalition during the Biden administration, remains committed to fulfilling the country’s obligations under the Paris Agreement. However, U.S. subnational actors now face a far more challenging landscape. With inflation, escalating tariffs, and the second Trump administration’s sweeping efforts to reshape the federal government dominating political discourse, climate action risks being sidelined at all levels.

Already, Trump’s moves against climate action this year have been wider in scope than those of his first time in office. His administration has moved to defund basic research on climate science, slashing budgets for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), restricting the capacity of the National Science Foundation (NSF), and even withdrawing support for American leadership in the IPCC’s Working Group III on climate mitigation.

The concern is particularly acute given the looming threats of rolling back IRA funding, which served as a financial backbone of subnational climate action under the Biden administration. If that weren’t enough, the administration is also poised to limit local governments’ ability to advance key climate strategies, such as expanding EV charging infrastructure.

According to the Sunnylands Statement, it is China’s turn to host the next subnational climate summit. While China is likely to uphold this commitment, it is highly uncertain whether U.S. subnational leaders will be able – or willing – to participate. The rising anti-China sentiment within the U.S. administration may make it less politically salient for subnational governments to engage openly with their Chinese counterparts.

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What’s Next?

Despite the pendulum swinging back toward inaction in the U.S., the climate crisis won’t wait. The next phase of U.S.-China climate collaboration demands greater creativity from subnational actors and a renewed emphasis on shared priorities, grounded in a pragmatic approach that clearly outlines the tangible benefits for both countries.

As this new era unfolds, the table is turning: the U.S. now has much to learn from China in key areas of climate action. From EVs to battery storage, solar PV, and notably offshore wind, China dominates global capacity, while the U.S. is struggling to catch up.

Climate impacts and resilience, an untapped area in existing subnational cooperation, is ripe for mutual benefit. At China’s recent Two Sessions parliamentary meeting, government work reports highlighted the rising threat of extreme weather, particularly floods and heat waves. Similarly, the U.S. is grappling with intensifying climate disasters, from record-breaking heat waves to catastrophic wildfires and hurricanes.

Given these shared vulnerabilities, collaboration in areas such as climate adaptation strategies, disaster preparedness, and resilient infrastructure presents a clear opportunity. With the Trump administration’s recent cuts to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) budget, local governments now face greater pressure to take the lead on disaster relief, creating an added incentive to align with best practices and strengthen resilience efforts.

Another essential step forward is broadening subnational climate cooperation beyond the two countries. Academics, non-profit organizations, and philanthropic groups are already exploring a Pacific Climate Dialogue aimed at expanding engagement with other East Asian countries. This initiative would ease the pressure that bilateral U.S.-China engagement puts on American and Chinese subnational actors, while forging a broader, multilateral collaboration on shared climate risks.

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China’s moves have taken on even more significance given developments in the U.S. Its financial regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission, is no longer defending American climate disclosure rules, which are being challenged in court. Instead, the acting SEC head now calls them “deeply flawed.”

It is one of many regressive actions taken by the second administration of Donald Trump that have devastated the climate community. While President Trump is busy signing executive orders to once again withdraw from the Paris Agreement, shutter environmental offices across the government, and gut the environmental justice office, Chinese regulators continue to deepen power market reform, accelerate clean energy deployment, and roll out new rules aimed at eventually mandating companies of all sizes to disclose climate-related risks, opportunities, and strategies.

To put the world on track with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C trajectory, China – like all countries – needs to do more. Among other things, the world’s largest current carbon emitter missed the recent deadline to submit the long-anticipated “NDC 3.0” (the third generation of Nationally Determined Contributions), a key document that should outline its commitment to emissions reduction and climate adaptation up to 2035.

Yet, the U.S.’s retreat offers China a near-effortless opportunity to reinforce its position as a global climate leader. It can simply maintain its existing commitments. As Dr. Michal Meidan noted in our previous roundtable, “China stands to gain, while the U.S. and the planet lose out.”

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Analysis: China’s Push For Sustainability Disclosure Can Boost Green Growth

New government documents seek to align the climate disclosures of Chinese companies with national priorities and global best practices.

By Edmund Downie and Erica Downs

Edited by Hongqiao Liu and Kevin Schoenmakers

Corporate climate disclosures – public reporting by companies about their exposure to and management of climate-related risks and opportunities – have been thin in Chinese capital markets. The quality of climate disclosures by Chinese firms has historically lagged both developed and developing economies in scope and depth.

Mainland regulations require at most minimal climate disclosures, and investors’ ESG awareness, a major driver in other markets, has only just started to emerge in the country.

But conditions are changing as China steadily improves disclosure standards and aligns with international best practices. Over the past year, Chinese regulators have unveiled two important documents aimed at narrowing the disclosure gap between Chinese firms and their global counterparts.

Our analysis of the new documents indicates that these new rules and guidelines align with two major national priorities: promoting a greener economy and boosting international trade and investment. Chinese leaders treat green upgrading as part of a science and technology modernization drive that can break through today’s economic headwinds to deliver durable growth. Better disclosures strengthen regulators’ toolkits to push green upgrading and reinforce China’s position at the heart of the global economy.

International Alignment

Last April, China’s three major stock exchanges in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing released Guidelines for Self-Discipline and Monitoring of Listed Companies – Sustainable Development Reports (Trial).

The Guidelines introduced the mainland’s first detailed mandates for sustainability disclosures in financial reporting. Hong Kong’s securities markets have had detailed sustainability disclosure mandates in effect since fiscal year 2017.

If fully implemented, the new policy would require companies that represent over half of the Chinese stock market to disclose issues such as greenhouse gas emissions and climate risk management in their annual Sustainable Development Reports – or Sustainability Reports – starting no later than the fiscal year 2025.

In December, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) released Corporate Sustainability Disclosure Standards – Basic Standards (Trial), that outlines high-level principles for a “national unified system of sustainability disclosure standards.” It defines basic concepts like “sustainability disclosure” and “sustainability risks and opportunities” and sets forth general principles around disclosures’ content, scope, and timing.

The accompanying official explainer to the Basic Standards indicates that MoF will lay out specific requirements and implementation details in the forthcoming Specific Standards and Guidance for Application. Altogether, the three documents will form the aforementioned national disclosure standards system. The new system, which China aspires to establish by 2030, is expected to replace the patchwork of inconsistent standards that guides companies who make disclosures today.

International best practices are the foundation of the two documents; the Basic Standards explainer explicitly notes that “most international principles [reviewed] are applicable for China.” Both the Guidelines and Basic Standards adopt a four-pillar disclosure framework – governance, strategy, risks and opportunities, and metrics and targets – that is based on the global baseline standards for sustainability reporting developed by the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), an independent standard-setting body. The specific mandates in the Guidelines and the principles in the Basic Standards align with the concepts and areas of emphasis that the ISSB highlights within its four pillars, on topics from risk identification and management to governance and monitoring frameworks.

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National Booster

While incorporating international best practices, the two policies are also rooted in China’s national strategies for green development, namely “high-quality development” and “Xi Jinping thought on ecological civilization.”

The Basic Standards, in particular, include distinctive adaptations to China’s governing context, so as to reinforce state targets around green upgrading. At least three elements differentiate China from the practices in other regional and global financial hubs. First, the Basic Standards define “government authorities” among the “users” of sustainability disclosures, alongside “investors” and “creditors.” Elsewhere, corporate sustainability disclosures first and foremost serve the financial community (“primary users”), with groups like government and civil society referenced as “other users” (EU) or not at all (ISSB). China’s terminology breaks from this model with a subtle compromise; it calls the financial community “basic users,” a term that implies no primacy over the government.

Second, the Basic Standards require firms to demonstrate that their corporate targets contribute to implementing “national laws, regulations, and strategic plans.” The ISSB and Japanese standards require companies to report on self-imposed and state-imposed targets, while the EU’s European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) only mention self-imposed targets. The differences in Chinese and EU reporting requirements reflect differences in their climate and policy approaches: Chinese authorities, unlike their EU counterparts, have frequently imposed firm-level energy conservation targets.

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The Basic Standards’ distinctive features allow authorities to use the disclosure framework to reinforce state-imposed targets and goals.

Changes to the Basic Standards draft released for public comment in May appear to underscore this aim. The final version broadens the basic principle of “materiality” – whether companies should include a given piece of information in their sustainability reporting. The draft used a financial definition of materiality: whether the information would have a “financial effect” on the reporting entity. The final version instead references users’ decision-making needs: “information on sustainability risks and opportunities whose omission, erroneous reporting, or unclear treatment would influence users in making decisions based upon it” counts as material. This adjustment better matches the Basic Standards’ user base and treatment of state targets.

The Basic Standards’ distinctive features also allow investors and other non-governmental actors to monitor companies’ performance on state-imposed targets alongside government authorities. Doing so provides an extra set of eyes to help regulators secure compliance with broader environmental and energy policies.

Chinese policymakers have used corporate disclosures in this manner before. ​​As documented by legal scholar Alex Wang, the environmental disclosure requirements on air and water pollution introduced in the early 2010s empowered non-governmental actors to monitor corporate behavior. Corporate disclosures allowed NGOs and citizens to launch public campaigns and file official complaints, leading to increased scrutiny of firms’ environmental compliance.

To be clear, the Basic Standards do not impose new sustainability targets on firms, nor have authorities introduced any firm-level targets for decarbonization. But policymakers have confirmed that, during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), China’s “dual control” target-setting system will shift from its focus on energy savings to carbon emission reductions. The Basic Standards propose a disclosure regime that could reinforce future firm-level target-setting policies on sustainability goals like carbon emissions.

Business Benefits

The creation of a unified national disclosure system aligned with international standards is partly aimed at supporting Beijing’s broader goal of boosting foreign capital inflows and increasing the global competitiveness of Chinese companies.

The official explainer for the Basic Standards makes this priority explicit:

Establishing [...] national unified sustainability standards is an effective route towards encouraging firms to put into practice sustainable development concepts, better participating in global trade and investment activities, raising international competitiveness, and advancing high-quality development.

The alignment reflects an effort to attract more capital from international investors, who prioritize ESG disclosures more than domestic ones.

International inflows to Chinese public capital markets have been weak amid the country’s faltering economy and increasing hostility to international business. Foreign purchases of Chinese stocks fell in 2023 to their lowest level since 2015 and showed no stable recovery before this fall’s major stimulus package.

Good ESG disclosures won’t reverse the fundamentals dragging down international inflows. But regulators know that disclosures matter to global investors, as reflected in spring 2022 comments by Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission vice chairman Fang Xinghai: “If you don’t disclose, you can’t go public, and you won’t get the support of international capital.”

On a practical level, aligning with international standards will prepare Chinese firms for more stringent regulations and allow them to better manage competitive pressure in export markets. There is growing consensus among financial media and opinion leaders that adhering to international standards will improve the transparency and credibility of Chinese firms in overseas markets and reduce their compliance costs.

As Fang Xinghai observed, EU countries “may examine the ESG information disclosed by Chinese firms in levying taxes.” The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – an import tariff based on products’ carbon footprint – is an example of such a tax. Other heated policy debates around “climate clubs” and sustainable sourcing in critical minerals suggest that sustainability-linked trade instruments may become more widespread, at least in Western markets.

Such trade-based tools will rely on granular product-level sustainability disclosures, not firm-wide disclosures, which are the subject of the Guidelines and Basic Standards. But the data-gathering apparatuses overlap, and investors will rely on firm-wide disclosures to assess firms’ competitive positions in sectors affected by climate/ESG-linked tariffs.

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Challenging Implementation

While the Guidelines and Basic Standards are noteworthy advances, full implementation will require substantial effort. Some of this effort is regulatory, as authorities flesh out the national disclosure standards system targeted for the end of the 15FYP in 2030. Major steps include the aforementioned Specific Standards and Guidance for Application, as well as “climate-related disclosure standards,” currently scheduled for release “by 2027.”

Yet mainstreaming these standards demands extensive capacity-building. Progress in this area will dictate the speed at which disclosure requirements are rolled out across various sectors.

Companies need to acquire knowledge about sustainability disclosures and the market needs to establish a pipeline of ESG talent to guide reporting. Demand for such talent is surging. As of early 2024, though, less than 10% of ESG professionals had relevant qualifications or certifications. The capacity gap will only widen as China transitions from voluntary disclosures for major public companies to mandatory disclosures for companies of all sizes, as proposed by the Basic Standards.

To address the talent shortage, authorities could establish a national ESG certification program similar to the one recently introduced in Hong Kong, and accompany it with training programs implemented by universities and industry associations such as the China Finance Society’s Green Finance Committee.

Additionally, Beijing could establish partnerships with regions that have extensive experience and long-standing practices in this area. An ideal model is the multi-faceted EU-China capacity-building program on the carbon market, in which government officials have engaged in comprehensive technical dialogues complemented by in-country training for Chinese companies. Such programs can also aid China’s international climate diplomacy, deepening partnerships with like-minded countries that ground its claims to climate leadership in a post-U.S. Paris context.

Finally, investor groups and civil society organizations can also play a crucial role by supporting capacity-building efforts and pushing for more effective and ambitious disclosure standards. Potential improvements include requiring third-party verification of emissions data to ensure integrity and accelerating the introduction of the “climate-related disclosure standards.”

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I hope you enjoy this newsletter. Share your thoughts in the comments.

If you’d like to write for Shuang Tan, republish our articles, or submit a testimonial, email us at contact@shuangtan.me.

Until next week,

Hongqiao

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In this essay, she reflects on the emotional rollercoaster of the past three years – starting with confusion, denial, and fear when first confronting the stark realities of climate disasters, followed by overwhelming anxiety and uncertainty, and eventually, a deep sense of urgency to wake up those sleepwalking into a boiling planet. She also speaks to the loneliness, helplessness, and frustration of struggling to find connection, empathy, and understanding – before finally discovering hope and optimism by celebrating small victories of herself, her colleagues, and her peers.

Sophie’s story deeply resonates with my own journey. A decade ago, I left journalism and joined CWR, after realizing that merely having a front-row seat to history did not fulfill my desire to drive social change. At CWR, I worked on research, investigations, and extensive stakeholder engagement to push businesses and financial institutions toward proactively tackling China’s environmental challenges, rather than standing by or taking advantage of the crisis. There, I learned to transform my cynicism, political frustration, and climate anxiety into strategic vision and agile action.

It was also during my time with CWR that I realized I should not limit myself to just writing to inform but that I should write for change. In many ways, writing and editing the Shuang Tan newsletter has become my own way of coping with climate anxiety, channeling disappointment and frustration into inspiration and collective consensus as I continue the long and urgent fight to save the planet.

I started this newsletter with one simple belief: Iit’s impossible to effectively tackle climate change without China, just as it’s impossible to build a prosperous China without adequate climate action. But as geopolitical turbulence continues, climate “islands” and “oases” are quickly turning into deserts. Do we really just need more diplomatic statements, policy analyses, and technological breakthroughs, or is something deeper holding us back? Perhaps more personal stories like Sophie’s could remind us why we are fighting this fight – for the planet, for humanity, and for people we love and care about.

I hope you enjoy this newsletter. Upgrade your subscription to read more powerful personal essays from Chinese journalists, social entrepreneurs, and campaigners as they reflect on their struggles, insights, and actions from the ground.

On a related note: I start to take clients as an authenticity and resilience coach. In this role, I hope to support more climate advocates and civil society professionals as they navigate personal and professional challenges – including learning to live with climate anxiety. For inquiries, please contact coach@liuhongqiao.com.

Essay: How I Spiraled Into Eco-Anxiety – And How I Cured It Through Action

A Gen Z Hong Kong native reflects on her emotional rollercoaster of declining the corporate path and instead diving into climate and water risk research.

By Sophie Lam

Edited by Hongqiao Liu and Kevin Schoenmakers

Three years ago, I was a fresh graduate from a U.K. university. Like most of my peers, I was set on a future in finance or consulting. Then I heard Debra Tan, the director of CWR, speaking at an event. The next thing I know, I threw my carefully plotted career plans out the window.

“Carbon is how we cause climate change; water is how we mostly feel it,” I remember Debra saying. Her talk shattered my narrow “carbon tunnel vision” and drowned me in the stark realities of water adaptation challenges that go far beyond reducing carbon emissions.

Growing up in Hong Kong, I had never considered that my home city, a wealthy global financial hub, would ever have to worry about water scarcity. After all, Mainland China has always ensured a stable fresh water supply for Hong Kong – what could possibly go wrong?

But then I discovered that this water is brought into the city by low-lying pumping stations, and that the city’s water supply is at risk of collapse because this critical lifeline is vulnerable to both powerful typhoons and rising seas.

That revelation felt like opening Pandora’s box. My naive self was thrown into an overwhelming whirlpool of information about the cascading impacts of climate change.

Terrified yet intrigued, I decided to dive deeper. I soon began a three-month internship at CWR, a Hong Kong-based think tank dedicated to embedding climate and water risks into business and finance.

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It was during this internship, while I assisted with mapping the city’s critical infrastructure such as rail lines, power supply equipment, and cold storage facilities against rising sea levels, that I came to another harrowing realization: within my lifetime, rising seas could permanently submerge thousands of Hong Kong homes – including my own.

Three months flew by. Determined to explore adaptation strategies that could save my home from being swallowed by the sea, I turned down a corporate job offer in the U.K. and joined CWR full-time.

I absorbed knowledge about climate and water risks like a sponge. My typical morning went like this: I logged monthly climate disasters and pored over scientific papers on vanishing glaciers, unstable tipping points, and record-breaking heat waves.

I am glad that I can use my knowledge of GIS software – which combines data with maps – to examine the impact of rising sea levels and extreme weather events on critical infrastructure in the Asia Pacific region. I also had the opportunity to work on CWR’s Re-IMAGINE HK initiative, which advocates for transformative adaptation by the Hong Kong government to save the city from future coastal threats. These efforts are all focused on improving resilience planning and managing the risks posed by climate change.

Nonetheless, I often felt myself coming back to the same questions. Given the worsening climate situation, is the work I’m doing meaningful? And how on earth am I making any impact?

The more I learned about the interconnectivity of climate and water risks, the harder it became to stay optimistic about our future. The data painted a grim reality: Our current emissions trajectory points to over 3°C of warming, and for Hong Kong, rising seas could jeopardize food supplies, flood transport systems, and cripple power infrastructure.

The weight of this knowledge, combined with my growing eco-anxiety, left me feeling out of sync with those around me. Desperate to spark conversations, I began sharing my “sea level rise 101” lectures and underwater HK maps with friends and family. But their typical reactions – disbelief, denial, or helplessness – only deepened my frustration. Even seasoned professionals at climate-related conferences offered little more than vague concern.

It seemed like no one else actually understood the severity of the crisis besides my colleagues at CWR. Loneliness and a sense of futility crept in, and I found myself spiraling into an eco-anxiety doom loop.

Despite everything, I continue to do what I do because, deep down, I know I am not alone in this fight. More importantly, as the youngest member of my team, I want to show the world that our generation has not given up – we still have opportunities to avoid the worst-case scenario.

Over the past three years, there have been moments that gave me hope. For example, CWR was invited to HSBC’s headquarters to present to concerned business leaders in the real estate, insurance, and utilities sectors on the topic of sea level rise risks in Hong Kong. Moments like these reassured me that the work my organization does is reaching the right people and making an impact.

I am also fortunate to have encountered many inspiring young people through my work. At the 2023 Stockholm International Water Week, I met Meghna Chakraborty, a junior rapporteur who founded the South Asia Young Women in Water platform shortly after the conference. This initiative empowers young women to lead conversations on water management. I also met numerous young inventors tackling issues such as pollution from microplastics or crude oil spills with innovative solutions.

To this day, I have no regrets about straying away from the corporate path. Joining CWR has opened my eyes to both the challenges and potential solutions for addressing water risks.

In my three years of working on climate and water issues, I have learned how to initiate uncomfortable but necessary conversations that drive meaningful change. While I constantly remind myself that climate change is not something we can solve overnight, I know that we no longer have the luxury of time.

It might be true that as an individual, we cannot control the accelerating pace of climate change, but we can still focus on the small yet meaningful changes we can make to combat it. We may have more collective bargaining power than we realize to influence corporate behavior. So, don’t be afraid to speak up and share your ideas.

After all, it’s our future that’s on the line. We must act now!

* The article is adapted from Sophie Lam’s essay that first appeared in CWR’s monthly newsletter.

* Cover Image Credit: Valeria Araya for ArtistsForClimate.org

Get in touch

I hope you enjoy this newsletter. Share your thoughts in the comments.

If you’d like to write for Shuang Tan, republish our articles, or submit a testimonial, email us at contact@shuangtan.me.

Until next week,

Hongqiao

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Shuang Tan is a proud partner of Covering Climate Now, a journalism collaboration dedicated to improving the caliber and prominence of climate journalism.

In 2024, China once again broke it…

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During his 26 years with Greenpeace International, John used documentary photography to raise public awareness of many environmental crises, including climate change. His takeaway? “Fun” and “positivity” are not just essential when you’re hiking through an icy mountain landscape, but also for reaching a wider audience and forging change.

This may sound counterintuitive, even troubling to some. After all, what’s fun and positive about climate change? But I know he is not attempting to sugarcoat disasters or to obsessively draw a “silver lining” on our planetary crisis.

It is true that we’re sleepwalking toward a future where global temperatures could rise by 3°C – a prospect that feels anything but positive. Yet, in moments of despair, we – as human beings – instinctively look for hope, because hope gives us the courage to connect, to create, and to envision a way forward.

John’s insights carry particular weight in the context of China, and they resonate with me so much. “Even” because today, most climate NGOs and think tanks in China primarily focus on influencing government policy. The landscape has become increasingly dry and technical, with a noticeable lack of inspiring, uplifting stories. This has led to a growing sense of fatigue, frustration, and disempowerment among climate advocates. “Especially” because we know from experience that negative narratives tend to have a shorter lifespan in China. A “positive” climate story, he argues, can inspire action, build momentum, and foster the collective belief that change is possible.

As we were editing this essay, two events took place on the Tibetan Plateau.

Two days ago, a 6.8 magnitude earthquake struck Dingri County in Shigatse Prefecture, less than 60 kilometers from Mount Qomolangma Base Camp. The very next day, nearly 1,000 kilometers away, another 5.5-magnitude earthquake shook Maduo County in Qinghai’s Golog Prefecture, where the Yellow River originates. The two earthquakes were “unrelated,” according to Chinese experts from the National Earthquake Networks Center.

And just two weeks ago, the Chinese government approved a massive hydropower project on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River. Designed to generate over three times more power than the Three Gorges Dam, the world’s next largest hydropower project – also the most expensive infrastructure – has been hailed as a milestone in China’s “dual carbon” goals and its efforts to combat climate change. Officials assured that the project “would not harm” downstream regions such as India and Bangladesh.

Despite the government’s assurances, some geological experts and environmental advocates see the project as a gamble. Over the past decade, many argue that preserving the region’s unparalleled biodiversity through national parks is a safer and more sustainable alternative to exploiting its hydropower potential.

We will delve deeper into the role of mega-hydropower projects in China’s “dual carbon” transition in a future newsletter. In the meantime, I wish you a belated Happy New Year, and I hope you enjoy the breathtaking photographs.

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John Novis: Finding the ‘Positive’ Climate Story Through ‘Photo Activism’

Greenpeace’s former Head of Photography reflects on why fun and positivity are key for successful campaigns – especially in China.

By John Novis

Edited by Hongqiao Liu and Kevin Schoenmakers

In 1997, I was part of a Greenpeace campaign to record the polar regions’ rapid loss of ice. At that time, man-made climate change was already the scientific consensus but was still far from widely accepted as alarming, urgent, or even as true. My goal was to repeat the success of an earlier expedition, during which we took photos that helped pressure nations to sign a treaty to protect Antarctica.

However, the photos we returned home with this time, after our long journey on the Arctic Sunrise ship, mostly showed stark landscapes. They lacked impacted people, flora, and fauna that would resonate with the public, let alone convey the urgent consequences of climate breakdown to governments, industries, or investors.

In search of more immediate visuals, we turned our focus to China. The Himalayas and the countless snow peaks on the Tibetan Plateau, known as the “Third Pole,” are home to the largest ice mass outside the polar regions. The area experiences climate change at a faster pace than anywhere else on the planet, affecting local communities, wildlife, and the mountain range’s many glaciers.

In the spring of 2007, after a 10-day expedition, we – an international team of scientists, photojournalists, and environmental advocates – arrived at the Rongbuk Glacier on the northern side of Qomolangma (Mount Everest) to document its retreat. Earlier expeditions and the Chinese Academy of Science had been monitoring the shrinkage of the glacier – one of the largest in the Himalayas – over a number of years.

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Greenpeace colleagues in the Beijing office had gained permission from China Science Press to use a 1968 panoramic photo showing the western side of the iconic glacier. It lies along the route mountaineers take to the peak, and as such features in many images and stories of those who have braved the conquest.

Our team set out walking across the glacier to reach the viewpoint of the 1968 photo. But after about half a day, our Tibetan guide halted the walk as crevasses had begun appearing. He feared for our safety. I was devastated that, after months of training and preparation for this singular endeavor, we could see our destination about a kilometer away but could advance no further. I started photographing from where we had stopped, the view being not exactly as in 1968 but close enough to give a visual comparison.

The Rongbuk Glacier was astonishing. A huge expanse of moraine, the dark sediment left by a glacier, filled the frame instead of the white ice that was abundant in the 1968 photo. It left me no doubt that rapid change was happening to the mountain. After carefully comparing the old and new photos, we concluded that the glacier had retreated by two kilometers over the preceding four decades.

The science seemed evident before our eyes: climate change disrupts the Himalayas’ water cycle. Moisture is carried from the ocean and falls as rain or snow on the mountains. Much of it seeps into the ground, with the mountains acting as gigantic sponges. The rest is stored as ice and melts slowly in summer. But rain is becoming more erratic, either coming in torrents or not at all. Such abnormal rainfall patterns can significantly contribute to groundwater depletion and, as a result, glacier shrinkage.

During the expedition, I also took photos of how the changing weather patterns affected local people and wildlife. At the time of the expedition to the Rongbuk Glacier, I didn’t fully grasp the far-reaching consequences of climate change. Looking back now, it is evident that the plight of Tibetan nomadic communities foreshadowed a much larger issue: climate refugees. All around the world, millions of people have been forced to flee their homes and seek survival in regions less impacted by climate change. This mass displacement poses immense risks to health, security, and economic stability, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

I had asked a Beijing-based environmental journalist to accompany the team to help make sure our journey would receive Chinese and international press coverage. Several magazines, including Marie Claire and Asia Geographic, published our photos and wrote accompanying features with titles such as “Mount Everest is Melting.” Leonardo DiCaprio shared a photo of a farmer and child in dryland conditions near Mount Qomolangma to his millions of social media followers. Greenpeace used the imagery in its fundraising, and I have used it in talks to demonstrate the difficulties of visualizing climate change.

During my 26-year tenure with Greenpeace, I documented all kinds of issues, from deforestation to illegal fishing, and, in China, grassland degradation, desertification, and water pollution. I witnessed how the organization’s photo assignments and edited imagery could change public perception and trigger debate about our relationship with the environment.

Over time, I gradually realized the clear distinction between the photo stories created at Greenpeace – what I call “photo activism” – and those produced in traditional photojournalism. While there is no difference in terms of quality, the images have different destinations. Our photos don’t just appear in news and magazine publications. We actively pushed for them to be used in press handouts, exhibitions, books, seminars, press conferences, fundraising events, and traditional and social media.

For photo activism to be effective, it is essential to document both the damage that is done and the beauty that is possible. For example, juxtaposing images of whales swimming freely or playful baby seals with scenes of their slaughter creates a striking aesthetic contrast, much like showcasing the grandeur of an ancient forest alongside the devastation of a clear-cut plot. Emphasizing positivity inspires hope, reminds viewers of what remains worth protecting, and encourages them to take action, instead of leading to indifference and thoughts like, “Why bother? It’s all messed up anyway.”

Now in retirement, I still remain an optimist about mankind’s climate change challenge. Perhaps my optimism stems from being young in the ‘60s and ‘70s, when changing ideas made an enlightened world seem possible. At the same time, I now see how hard it is for my daughters and grandchildren, who have never known a world without climate change, to keep spirits high.

But I believe photo activism continues to be a powerful tool for creating debate and evoking action, perhaps more so than ever. Technology and media have radically shifted since our expeditions in the 2000s. Climate pressure groups and citizen journalists armed with smartphones and social media capture and share every extreme weather event and climate protest. Even in less open societies such as China or Russia, I believe such imagery will find its way past internet controls and have people demanding action.

More recently, as our already saturated information landscape has seen the arrival of AI-generated images meant to disinform, people’s first response to a photo is not to consider its content but to question its credibility. However, I could see AI-generated photo activism appealing to a new generation and enhancing the climate debate.

Another source of optimism, for me, is how climate change protests were almost exclusively organized by NGO protest groups back in the 2000s, yet today young people are expressing their concerns on a grassroots level and organizing protests through social media. I documented one Fridays for Future demonstration through a participant’s eyes, from making banners in her family living room with school friends to marching and finishing the day at a rally with a national politician making an impassioned speech.

And I believe optimism is the driving force behind any successful campaign. As long as a team maintains their vision and group spirit despite disagreement and infuriating obstacles, optimism will surface the “fun” elements of the action even in the darkest moments. If we were all pessimists, nothing would happen at all!

Get in touch

I hope you enjoy this newsletter. Share your thoughts in the comments.

If you’d like to write for Shuang Tan, republish our articles, or submit a testimonial, email us at contact@shuangtan.me. 

Until next week,

Hongqiao

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More importantly, we asked ourselves a crucial question: how can we develop Trump-proof policies? After all, this time, we have no excuse to claim we were caught off guard.

Sadly, with the rise of far-right movements across almost all continents, we might have to brace ourselves for more challenges to climate action from Trump-like politicians and the voters who support them. 

Climate overshoot is imminent. We cannot afford any more inactions or setbacks.

PS. You can read a Chinese version of our discussion in our Caixin Column.

#16: What Would Another Trump Presidency Mean for the U.S., China, and the Climate?

Record-breaking climate catastrophes worldwide – both in frequency and severity – in the past eight years have evidently failed to alter the stance of Donald J. Trump, a known climate skeptic and once again the Republican presidential nominee. Few doubt that he will withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement for the second time if re-elected. Worse, he could pull out of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change altogether and eliminate contributions to any multilateral climate program.

These actions would mean that the world’s largest cumulative carbon emitter would evade loss and damage compensations, and that the world’s largest economy would be absent from the ongoing negotiations for a new climate finance deal.

The expected policies of Trump’s second term, such as boosting domestic oil and gas production and cutting subsidies for electric vehicles, could result in up to four billion metric tons of additional carbon emissions. This would not only mean that the U.S. would fail to meet its emission reduction commitments under the Paris Agreement (which would become void upon withdrawal) but also that the world would further deviate from the 1.5-degree Celsius target, exacerbating and accelerating the runaway effects of climate change.

However, how Trump’s potential second term would impact global climate action goes beyond energy and climate policies. They also manifest in trade and security policies, such as reducing U.S. dependence on China, raising trade barriers to make U.S. companies competitive in clean technologies, and wresting control away from China over the entire cleantech supply chain, from mineral extraction and refining to equipment manufacturing. Escalating the trade war with China, however, could make the U.S.’ domestic transition more expensive, and slow down global cleantech deployment.

What is your general assessment of how Donald Trump’s possible second term will impact climate action?

Kate Logan: The potential re-election of Donald Trump could have devastating impacts on global climate progress. “Project 2025,” a document from the conservative Heritage Foundation, suggests that the U.S. should withdraw from the Paris Agreement again and also leave the entire UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Although Trump has tried to distance himself from this controversial document, industry lawyers are preparing executive orders for a possible future Trump administration, including one to exit the UNFCCC. This move would exclude the world’s largest historical emitter and second-largest current emitter from the primary mechanism governing global climate response, making it extremely difficult for the U.S. to engage in global climate discussions. While rejoining the Paris Agreement is not impossible, it would first require the U.S. to rejoin the UNFCCC, a move that likely requires Senate approval and risks “freez(ing) the U.S. out of the system indefinitely.”

Travis Brubaker: Besides withdrawing from multilateral climate negotiations and programs, Trump might introduce a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The Republican-introduced proposal “Foreign Pollution Fee Act” would impose fees on imported goods with higher carbon intensities than domestic products, specifically targeting industries in China and other countries. This bill combines two familiar elements from Trump’s first presidency: tariffs and “holding China accountable.” Despite Trump’s criticism of Biden’s climate policies as a “green new scam,”  he is unlikely to revoke the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Instead, he may revise it to maintain the green investment flow into Republican congressional districts.

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Belinda Schäpe: A second Trump presidency would significantly set back U.S. climate policies, posing profound impacts on domestic and global climate efforts. The extra 4 billion tonnes of emissions resulting from Trump’s energy and industry policies would negate the emissions savings achieved by renewable energy initiatives worldwide over the past five years. This means that the U.S. would miss its Paris Agreement targets, further diminishing the chances of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.

Cory Combs: Trump’s climate policies offer no meaningful benefits beyond serving his immediate political interests. Most analyses suggest that another Trump presidency would have tragic implications for the climate. His politics create a false dichotomy between climate action and national security, using largely unfounded arguments to portray renewables and low-carbon development as threats to economic security. Nevertheless, the global economy is moving toward a climate transition, with or without U.S. involvement. The U.S.’s failure to adapt to an increasingly decarbonized economy will gradually erode its influence in the global economy and its leadership in global governance – all while delaying climate action.

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How would Trump change the course of U.S.-China climate cooperation?

Travis Brubaker: During his first four years in office, Trump adopted a combative and hawkish tone toward both China and climate issues, a stance he continues in his current campaign. This rhetoric, along with the initiation of a “trade war,” has already strained bilateral relations. By explicitly painting China as an enemy rather than a strategic competitor, Trump has reduced the space for all forms of diplomacy, including climate negotiations.

Belinda Schäpe: Under a second Trump presidency, the hard-earned positive outcomes from U.S.-China climate cooperation could collapse. This cooperation has acted as a stabilizer in the tense geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China, helping to pave the way for the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Climate Pact. While the results have been mixed, ending this meaningful channel of communication would likely prevent more ambitious national ambitions and stall global initiatives on methane mitigation, coal phase-out, and renewable energy expansion.

Kate Logan: A Trump administration would likely eliminate government-to-government channels for U.S.-China climate dialogues, which former U.S. climate envoy John Kerry and his team worked hard to reestablish under Biden. This would leave a vacuum in state-level climate diplomacy, forcing non-state and subnational entities to sustain engagement until at least 2029. However, these unofficial channels might also face increased scrutiny under Trump’s proposed “maximum pressure” approach toward China.

Climate change was the only area under Biden where the U.S. and China produced joint documents. Without this cooperation, there would be little to safeguard the U.S.-China relationship, increasing the risk of minor misunderstandings escalating into significant conflicts. Meanwhile, China could continue to portray the U.S. as a climate villain and a “destroyer of multilateralism,” using the U.S.’s absence to evade pressure to align its climate actions with the Paris Agreement. This vicious cycle would harm the planet, as the world’s two largest emitters avoid responsibility rather than collaborate, dramatically raising the risk of climate overshoot.

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Dr. Michal Meidan: A second Trump administration would weaken the prospects of joint action, mainly because the U.S. would leave the Paris Agreement. However, collaboration on tackling methane emissions is already at risk of getting caught up in deteriorating bilateral tensions.

The U.S.’s chief climate advisor, John Podesta, is set to visit China later this year ahead of COP29 to discuss efforts to curb methane emissions, as well as measures to reduce the environmental impacts of hydrofluorocarbons and nitrous oxide. Even if Trump doesn’t return to power, there is a growing likelihood that these talks will yield very limited results because of trade frictions that are souring bilateral relations. Even if Trump doesn’t return to power, there is a growing likelihood that the ongoing U.S.-China climate talks will yield very limited results due to trade frictions that are souring bilateral relations.

What would the U.S. gain – if anything – from Trump’s China and climate policies?

Dr. Michal Meidan: Trump’s pledges to slow the electrification of transport and the deployment of renewables in the U.S. may reduce dependence on Chinese materials, components, and products. However, this could also limit incentives for U.S. original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to innovate and produce, potentially hindering their global competitiveness.

Trump’s policies could – contrary to his intentions – do China some good. If a new Trump administration supports fossil fuels and scales back renewable energy policies, it could give China greater energy flexibility and expand its global influence while weakening the U.S.’s own competitiveness. As the world’s largest oil consumer and fastest-growing LNG importer, China could benefit directly from increased U.S. oil and gas production, assuming exports continue to grow. Indeed, after the first Trump administration, U.S. oil and gas exports to China increased as part of the Phase 1 trade deal, aimed at balancing the U.S. trade deficit with China.

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Belinda Schäpe: For Trump, climate change is not just a hoax but a “Chinese hoax.” He seeks to boost domestic energy production and reduce reliance on Chinese supplies, potentially increasing tariffs on Chinese clean technology imports. An escalated “trade war” with China over green technologies could make the U.S. energy transition more expensive, further slowing domestic decarbonization and global renewable deployment.

Current import restrictions have already made solar PVs twice as expensive in the U.S. compared to the EU. Trump’s threat to impose a 60% blanket tariff on all Chinese imports could further disrupt the global clean energy market, hinder progress in both countries, exacerbate bilateral tensions, and complicate global climate action.

Cory Combs: Trump does not have a strategy to promote genuine technological and industrial competitiveness. Instead of addressing the disparity in clean technology competitiveness with China, he dismisses these technologies, ignoring the missed economic opportunities.

Competition drives innovation, which in turn boosts competitiveness. However, Trump’s naive protectionism and lack of innovation-encouraging policies hinder the U.S.’s chances of catching up in clean technology and critical supply chains, particularly with China.

Moreover, his rejection of clean technology competition, a race where the U.S. is already behind, contrasts sharply with the EU’s approach. The EU’s new energy vehicle tariffs aim to level the playing field and maintain constructive competition with Chinese clean technology leaders. While not perfect, the EU’s strategy promotes long-term industrial competitiveness and decarbonization, unlike Trump’s policies, which do neither.

How would another Trump presidency impact the energy transition and climate action in the rest of the world? 

Kate Logan: I’m concerned about the ripple effects on developing countries. Instead of increasing U.S. support as an alternative to Chinese investments, Trump’s “America First” platform would significantly cut foreign aid. By gutting U.S. climate personnel and resources for the Global South, Trump would eliminate a key source of competitive pressure on China to fulfill Xi Jinping’s 2021 promise of stepping up support for green and low-carbon energy development for developing countries.

The Biden administration’s effort to “friendshore” supply chains for clean technologies has benefited some developing countries by channeling more investment into their manufacturing capacities, although progress has been slow. Conversely, Trump’s rollback of incentives for low-carbon technology manufacturing, alongside a doubling down on protectionist trade policies, would likely do little to support the Global South or bring down the cost of green goods globally.

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Belinda Schäpe: Given the two countries’ global influence, a worsened bilateral climate relationship would weaken international climate commitments and stall decarbonization progress. Trump’s long-term China policy aims to challenge China’s global influence, but withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and cutting climate finance contributions would undermine the U.S.’s credibility as a reliable partner, particularly in the Global South.

Without pressure to raise ambitions, China could position itself as the only major power with a credible climate record. Particularly, in the absence of U.S. climate finance contributions, it is unlikely we’ll see China step up in the new climate finance deal besides continuing its existing voluntary efforts through South-South climate cooperation.

Travis Brubaker: Trump’s anti-decarbonization domestic agenda will undermine the U.S.’s credibility in promoting climate efforts abroad and may even harm international private-sector initiatives. For example, a UN-led effort to decarbonize the insurance industry quickly disbanded after the U.S. State Attorney General publicly expressed that it would hurt domestic coal producers. Trump could amplify such positions using the power of the bully pulpit.

Dr. Michal Meidan: Regardless of Trump’s policies, the global energy transition will continue. The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events underscore the urgency to act. If the U.S. exits the Paris Agreement again, China could claim it remains truly committed to the global energy transition, contrasting itself with the U.S. as it continues to produce and deploy renewables at breakneck speed. China will also remain involved in and committed to the COP process, in stark contrast to the U.S. 

Beijing will seek to further cement its leadership position – at least rhetorically – in the Global South by championing the G77 in the COP process and, more broadly, by adopting anti-U.S. rhetoric in the global forum. In practical terms, Chinese companies are investing in new energy infrastructure in emerging economies. Although many of these investments are aimed at “tariff-jumping” – producing new energy supplies that can then be exported to the U.S. or the EU without incurring duties – they can still create growth and employment in host countries. If host countries can respond with the right policies, then Chinese investments can also lead to technology diffusion and learning – and even energy system upgrades. In any case, China stands to gain, while the U.S. and the planet lose out.

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How can the world develop Trump-proof policies to avert the worst consequences of climate change?

Cory Combs: Ironically, Trump’s climate policies undermine his stated economic and security goals, weakening U.S. interests. These policies decrease U.S. competitiveness, with the most economically vulnerable workers, especially in manufacturing, suffering the most. In turn, they would perpetuate conditions for destructive populism, further fueling the resentment and political impulses that first brought Trump to power.

Practically, I believe that convincing Trump that he is shooting himself in the foot would be more effective than trying to sway his voters. The silver lining, if any, is that Trump can be influenced by powerful economic and political partners, such as the EU. When he sees political opportunities that appeal to his base, he may be willing to amend specific policies, including those on climate. In his first term, he showed some policy flexibility when he saw potential for political gain, especially in foreign policy. He tends to seek what he deems good one-off “business” deals rather than pursuing long-term strategic opportunities. 

To help keep the U.S. – and decarbonization – on a better track, partner countries would need to convince Trump that his policies leave valuable economic and political opportunities on the table, and propose arrangements he can frame as economic or political victories for his base. It may be challenging to formulate proposals in line with both Trump’s and their own interests, but I certainly believe such opportunities exist – particularly through extensions of Biden’s “friendshoring” and other climate-friendly trade and investment efforts.

Kate Logan: We can still prepare and safeguard against the most catastrophic outcomes. Non-state actors can work with the current U.S. administration to institutionalize the areas where U.S.-China climate cooperation has made progress over the past four years by “mirroring” priority topics through parallel channels.

Chinese officials and those from other key countries can consider their plans to respond to a potential Trump scenario, both in the immediate term at COP29 and the G20 and in the medium term throughout his potential presidency.

Most importantly, there is still ample time to sound the alarm to U.S. voters about the dire consequences of a potential second Trump administration for the future of the world.

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An enormous thank you to all the participants. If you read Shuang Tan, you should follow their work, too.

• Kate Logan, Associate Director of Climate, Asia Society Policy Institute, and Fellow, Center for China Analysis;

• Belinda Schäpe, China Policy Analyst, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air;

• Cory Combs, Associate Director, Trivium China;

• Dr. Michal Meidan, Head of China Energy Research, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies;

• Travis Brubaker, Senior Policy Advisor for U.S. Climate Foreign Policy, E3G.

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Shuang Tan is an independent initiative dedicated to tracking China’s energy transition and decarbonization. It’s curated, written, and edited by Hongqiao Liu. 

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Have a different take? Please share your thoughts in the comments. If you would like to contribute to Shuang Tan, email us at contact@shuangtan.me.

If you find the newsletter helpful, we encourage you to become a paid subscriber to support our work. Each newsletter requires dozens of hours of preparation. Your support would enable us to go far. 

For feedback, inquiries, and funding opportunities, please write to contact@shuangtan.me.

Till next week,

Hongqiao

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In this analysis, I, along with Anqi Dang, a Paris-based green finance…

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当我在一年多前创办carboneer时，我不可能想到我会将四分之三的时间都放在帮助欧盟进口商及其中国出口商应对碳边境调整机制（CBAM）。这项由欧盟于近期推出的碳定价机制旨在对进口商品中隐含的碳排放进行定价。由于大量进口中国的钢铁和铝制品，许多欧盟进口商在 CBAM合规问题上面临着越来越大的压力。

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当前关于中国公民气候意识的调查有限，结果也往往相左。根据调查方、年份和受访人群的不同，此类调查得出的结论从中国人“强烈”关心气候变化到“气候意识薄弱”不一而足。一些研究称中国的老年人“更受气候焦虑困扰”，另一些则称年轻人虽然关心气候议题但行动不足。因研究方法不一致，我们难以对这些调查结论进行横向比较。

“中国人关心气候变化吗？”我经常被问到这个问题，即便是…

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China’s state planner, the National Development and Reform Commission, recently issued yet another directive to promote the “clean and efficient” use of coal. While “clean coal” is often framed as a crucial pathway for maintaining energy security and facilitating a smooth t…

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近年来，因一些国家未能履行《巴黎协定》下的减排承诺，气候领域开始将减少温室气体排放、控制全球气候变暖的努力转移到非二氧化碳气体上。甲烷是一种强效温室气体，是仅次于二氧化碳的第二大环境污染物。中国已加入减少甲烷的全球行动中，但正如俗话所说，细节决定成败。

煤矿排放

我国能源行业的甲烷排放主要来源于煤炭行业。根据我国最新发布的《国家温室气体清单》，2018年，中国的甲烷排放量约为6411万吨。其中42%的排放来自能源系统——39%来自煤矿，3%来自石油和天然气。这与发达国家的情况截然相反：中欧美国家，油气行业是甲烷排放的主要源头。

我国煤矿甲烷的排放中有大概80%来自煤矿地下开采，其余则主要来自于…

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Simon是欧洲能源交易所（EEX）的认证交易员，拥有十年在能源、电力、碳市场及政策分析领域的工作经验。在2023年联合创立carboneer后，他很快发现自己被与CBAM履约相关的咨询项目包围。在过去十个月里，他帮助30余家中国公司及其欧盟进口商学习这一新碳价机制，应对数据缺失、规则负责、合规成本高昂等诸多挑战。

欧盟委员会引入CBAM的初衷是补充现行的欧盟排放交易体系（EU ETS），防止“碳泄漏”，即欧洲公司将其碳密集型活动转移到其他环保法规较为宽松的地区。EU ETS一度是全球最大的碳市场，直到被中国于2021年启动的全国…

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The lack of reliable survey data makes it difficult to understand the reasons behind the public’s indifference or how the absence of science-based, timely, and human-centered climate information influences everyday decision-making.

The limited surveys on Chinese citizen’s climate awareness often draw contradictions. Depending on the survey provider, the year, and the population surveyed, conclusions range from strong or weak climate awareness to the elderly experiencing higher climate anxiety or youth being aware but inactive. Incompatible methodologies make comparison difficult.

“Do Chinese people care about climate change?” I’m often asked, and even experts in the China climate community demand an answer. Snapshotting the views and actions of 1.4 billion people, spread across 9.6 million square kilometers with varying levels of education, income, and media literacy, is impossible. More importantly, what does “caring for climate change” even mean?

In this week’s newsletter, Shanghai-based social entrepreneur Jing Feng shares how her father’s sudden illness this summer put her advocacy of sustainable lifestyles on the back burner in favor of the conveniences of food delivery, ride-hailing, and online shopping. 

China has the world’s biggest online commerce market. In 2020 alone, food delivery generated 1.6 million tons of plastic trash, accounting for 3% of China’s total municipal solid waste. Without doubt, the over 400 million customers of China’s food delivery industry are actively contributing to climate change, environmental pollution, and biodiversity loss through their daily consumption behaviors. But does that mean they are simply unconcerned about climate change?

Support Shuang Tan

Shuang Tan is an independent initiative dedicated to tracking China’s energy transition and decarbonization. The newsletter is curated, written, and edited by Hongqiao Liu. 

Or, as Jing reflects, when people are in “survival mode,” overwhelmed by immediate concerns, they don’t have additional bandwidth for climate change, even as this seemingly distant and abstract notion is already shaping their lives. Jing’s preoccupation was her father’s illness; for others, it could be financial strain, time poverty, or political depression.

The danger of short-term thinking and action is that we risk losing the critical window to break free from this vicious cycle. Armed conflicts, geopolitical turmoil, and amplified social inequality should not serve as excuses to delay climate action. Instead, efforts to preserve planetary health should be embraced as opportunities for building peace, fostering dialogue, and driving reform.

Jing Feng: Don’t Wait Until the ICU to Care About Your Health – Or Our Planet

A Shanghai sustainable living advocate reflects on planetary health after two months caring for her critically ill father during a scorching summer.

Written by Jing Feng 

Edited by Hongqiao Liu

July 21, 2024, Urumqi. At 7 a.m., my day began with the steady hum of breathing equipment from my father’s room. The care worker was carrying out a urine bottle while my mother, already up for some time, was in the kitchen preparing breakfast. I silenced my alarm and went straight to work, organizing my father’s dozens of daily pills.

The following three days turned out to be the hottest on record. Earlier that week, my father had been discharged from the ICU after a month fighting a severe lung infection whose cause doctors could not find. His diabetes, combined with lungs weakened by an earlier COVID-19 infection, left him critically vulnerable.

Before his return home, I scrambled to install an air conditioner. Built in the early 2000s, our apartment lacks proper insulation, and turns into an oven during heatwaves. His oxygen concentrator, running 24/7, only added to the oppressive heat. For my mother, cooking in the kitchen – the hottest corner of the house – was torture. But we weren’t the only family vying for precious installation slots. In Urumqi, a city farther from the cooling effect of the ocean than any other and where the summer temperature record stands at 42.6°C (108.7°F), air conditioners have become highly coveted. Securing one amid fierce demand felt like a small yet important victory not just for our comfort, but for my father’s survival.

2,500 kilometers away in Shanghai, where I’ve been living since 2013, I am a social entrepreneur, advocating for sustainable living. I also host “Road to Tomorrow,” a popular Chinese-language podcast where I discuss how people can change their everyday lives to help build a sustainable future. But my father’s condition forced me to confront the climate crisis on a deeply personal level.

At 63, he had become part of the population most vulnerable to its impacts. Today, his survival depends on a stable electricity supply. If the power went out – air conditioning overwhelming power generators is a seasonally recurring threat in China – he would quickly lose access to the oxygen that keeps him alive. To prepare for the worst, I bought a 40-liter oxygen tank. The tank, the largest I could find, cost 1,000 yuan ($140), and can keep him breathing for 40 hours in case of a blackout.

During those two months of caring for him, my life narrowed to focus solely on his survival. My usual preoccupation with environmental and climate issues faded. The constant stream of negative news – floods, wildfires, heatwaves – became overwhelming, and I instead distracted myself with funny videos. Still, in quiet moments, I couldn’t help but wonder: how many others were living on the edge, just one power outage away from tragedy?

My commitment to sustainable living collided with the harsh demands of caregiving. Usually championing reduced consumption and sustainable living, I found myself relying on cars, take-out, and online shopping more than I ever had before. I knew the environmental and social costs, but when survival was at stake, convenience took precedence. Every day became a battle to get through the immediate challenges.

I even started to try to put my mother, a frugal teacher, at ease as we watched the ICU bills eat into their modest retirement savings, telling her, “If money can fix it, then it’s not really a problem.” It was only half true. Fortunate to have been able to afford health insurance, and fortunate that I had not bought a Shanghai apartment for which I’d had to rely on their help, we could pay my father’s medical bills. But any future setbacks could break our budget, and, in any case, money alone wouldn’t make him better. It made me realize climate change is much the same, instead that the finances to fight that crisis are entirely inadequate.

The two-month caregiving experience in Urumqi pushed me out of my comfort zone and made me question the accessibility of sustainable living. I started to see it as a privilege reserved for the middle class – those with the financial means to choose it. Sustainable choices require a safety net, something not everyone has, especially those who are still fighting to survive.

Health and climate vulnerabilities are deeply intertwined. The UN reports that heat-related deaths among people over 65 have increased by 85% over the past 20 years. In China, studies have shown that during heatwaves, respiratory infections rise by 30%. Globally, more than 70% of the workforce is exposed to extreme heat risks, including the delivery workers who have become essential, especially during health crises.

As WHO Director-General Tedros Ghebreyesus has stated, “The climate crisis is also a health crisis.” Yet, like my family did, most people only grasp the severity of a crisis when it’s too late. Whether it’s human health or planetary health, we can’t afford to wait until we’re in the ICU.

I fear that by the time the climate crisis reaches its tipping points – and we’ve already surpassed many – we’ll be forced into survival mode, turning to controversial solutions like geoengineering or nuclear energy as desperate fixes rather than addressing the root causes when we still have the chance.

Just as we all understand that it’s important to prevent diseases, we must take care of the planet before the damage is irreparable. While individuals can make sustainable lifestyle changes to reduce their environmental footprint, society as a whole must invest in disaster preparedness, climate mitigation, and adaptation.

This summer, my father came so close to death. A month after leaving the ICU, he’s only just starting to walk again. Even a minor illness – or a short power outage – could set back his fragile recovery.

Our planet is just as vulnerable. The actions humanity is taking today are not sufficient to halt global warming, let alone reverse its damage. I hope that my father continues to heal, and that I can live healthily on a flourishing planet.

Get in touch

I hope you enjoy this newsletter. Share your thoughts in the comments. If you’d like to write for Shuang Tan, republish our articles, or submit a testimonial, email us at contact@shuangtan.me.

We will soon start accepting submissions. Stay tuned for our pitch guide! 

For feedback, inquiries, and funding opportunities, please write to contact@shuangtan.me.

Until next week,

Hongqiao

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这起诉讼的难点是如何评估二氧化碳排放造成的损害。尽管科学界一致认为二氧化碳等温室气体是气候变化的罪魁祸首，但在中国的司法实践中，核定自然、环境和气候损害的价值仍是一个棘手的挑战。

我们了解到，原告及其法律团队最初试图以中国碳市场中的交易价格作为损害赔偿的基准。在上诉阶段，原告则提出了每吨二氧化碳一元的象征性赔偿额。从碳交易和气候政策的长期观察者的角度看，这两个提法未免都有些外行了。

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甲烷是一种强效温室气体。在进入大气后的前20年中，其升温效应比二氧化碳高出80多倍。在中国，与煤炭相关的甲烷排放不仅涵盖了煤炭开采过程、采后活动和废弃或关闭的煤矿中的排放（“煤矿瓦斯”），还包含作为“非常规油气资源”主动抽采的“煤层气”。核定自愿减排量的方法论仅适用于前者，而排放标准对两者均适用。

中国是全球最大的甲烷排放国。与发达国家以油气、农业或废弃物为主的甲烷排放结构不同，煤…

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In this heartfelt essay, Faye highlights the challenges of reporting on climate in China. While extreme disasters are becoming more frequent, newsrooms are struggling with understaffing, underfunding, and constant censorship pressure. Journalists often fight for access to disaster sites, only to find that, once they get it, the frontline of the catastrophic weather event has already moved. Even when they manage to file reports, their stories may go “404” at any time, while readers, fatigued by repetitive “negative energy,” are losing interest. This creates a vicious cycle: vital information fails to reach vulnerable communities in climate-sensitive areas, leaving them uninformed, unprepared, and unable to build resilience.

Faye describes covering China’s climate crisis as “a Sisyphean task.” Anyone who practiced journalism in China would share this sentiment, caught between censorship, financial strain in the news industry, and reader disengagement, relying only on willpower and idealism – a “Quixotic act” – to continue their work.

In this constant tug-of-war, burnout is almost inevitable. It’s unsurprising that many in the industry face severe mental health crises. Ten years ago, when I worked as a journalist in China, nearly half the reporters in my news department suffered from depression, anxiety, or bipolar disorder. One colleague, hospitalized with severe depression, turned to public education on mental health but eventually took his life just before the zero-COVID policy was lifted.

Frontline reporters covering disasters and crises like climate change urgently need systemic support. When I covered the record-breaking rainfall in Beijing in 2012, there were no protections, emergency plans, or mental health support – even when our scoop exposed how “low-end” workers living beneath manhole covers suffocated to death, how a middle-class man drowned when his car got stuck in a flooded underpass in central Beijing, and how flash floods swept away dozens in their sleep who were never acknowledged in official records.

Unfortunately, the situation has not improved much – if anything, it has only deteriorated.  Discussions on Chinese journalism still revolve around the same buzzwords: “censorship,” “propaganda,” and the operational challenges media organizations face. The well-being of individual reporters, these issues’ collateral damage, is rarely addressed. Meanwhile, many in the climate community tend to see journalists and media outlets as mere vehicles for their strategic messaging. Independent initiatives like Shuang Tan continue to struggle while sustaining our important and impactful work.

Curating and editing Faye’s essay over the past two months has been a painful and triggering experience for me – and undoubtedly for Faye. At one point, we had to pause the editing process and considered abandoning the piece altogether. Like many of my peers, I, too, went through years of therapy before I could finally see my experience as an investigative journalist in China as an asset instead of the source of persistent disappointment, despair, and defeat.

I hope you enjoy this newsletter. Share your thoughts in the comments. If you’d like to write for Shuang Tan, republish our articles, or submit a testimonial, email us at contact@shuangtan.me.

Until next week,

Hongqiao

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Essay: Can Journalism or Art Best Document China’s Climate Emergency?

A former award-winning photojournalist reflects on her experience covering extreme weather’s impact while navigating censorship and budget cuts.

by Faye Liang

In June 2022, after heavy rain had flooded Qingyuan, in Guangdong province, a local farmer showed me around his submerged land on a rubber dinghy. The smell of dead pigs penetrated my nostrils as their inflated bodies drifted alongside the boat. Ducks, the farm’s only survivors, had found refuge on top of a shed. I saw a mouse paddle through the water as fast as its little limbs would allow. Just as the farmer, and perhaps all of us, it had no idea where it could find safety.

More than 3,300 local farmers filed insurance claims worth some 329 million yuan. Others, who couldn’t or wouldn’t pay for insurance, could only count on next year’s earnings.

It was one of many climate disasters I’d documented over the past seven years while working as a photojournalist in China. I believed that my work had purpose – most of all, that it could help the public prepare for future extreme weather. Every reporting trip taught me something new, until they became so repetitive that I started to doubt what I was doing.

In 2016, while covering a temporary settlement site for people affected by flooding of the Yangtze River, I first realized how climate change exacerbates China’s existing social issues. In a small village near Wuhan, evacuees – mostly seniors told to leave their homes overnight – shared with me their biggest concern was losing their livestock and crops, which they depended on to bolster their meager pensions.

Four years later, while covering another extreme rainfall event in a small town near Poyang Lake whose reservoir had overflowed, I learned just how resilient people can be. Despite a lack of experience and equipment, the local community displayed remarkable ingenuity. They crafted rafts from plastic buckets and wooden planks torn from submerged houses. These improvised vessels became lifelines, enabling them to transport essential supplies like food, clean water, and fuel.

I saw how extreme weather can take everything from someone – and then do it again. During a severe flood in Guangdong, in 2022, I met rural entrepreneur Mr. Huang. He had lost almost all his property overnight – floodwaters had drowned 80,000 pigeons in their tiny cages. Despite suffering a loss of 3 million yuan ($420,000), Huang was determined to rebuild his business. Sadly, this summer, his farm flooded once again.

Witnessing so many climate-related disasters up-close has given me a firsthand understanding of climate change and its social impacts. But covering the same tragedies again and again made me question the meaning of photojournalism. Was I truly making a difference? 

A cloud of guilt enveloped me. My reporting hardly brought the changes that survivors hoped for, be that financial aid or environmental improvement; and sometimes, my coverage even seemed to worsen their situation. Though I now understand it’s not my fault, I still struggle to find peace with this cruel reality.

As global warming worsens, visual documentation of extreme weather disasters – with photos, videos, and illustrations – has only become more vital to make the public aware of and prepared for climate change. As Lu Guang’s award-winning work on environmental pollution and human suffering demonstrates, a well-crafted photo essay can have profound social impact, even in China.

However, high-quality photo reports have become scarce in China. Today, the country’s photojournalists face three major obstacles: the authorities’ tightening censorship, the public’s growing caution and distrust, and media companies’ diminishing willingness and ability to pay the high costs of covering extreme weather events.

My friend D, a veteran photojournalist, has spent the last six years documenting catastrophes across China. Increasingly, he feels overwhelmed: keeping pace with the growing frequency of extreme weather events has become a Sisyphean task. This April, after a historic town was devastated by floods and mudslides, it took him a week to secure approval from editors before he could start his difficult journey into the disaster zone. By the time he reached the scene, the extreme rainfall had already shifted north, causing floods elsewhere in other regions.

His photos also didn’t pass censorship. The public never saw them. Media were instead made to publish positive reports celebrating the triumph of disaster relief.

The increasing frequency of such challenges has intensified the sense of futility felt by many of my peers. We are often unsure whether our work will have any impact. Could my photo essays shift public perception of climate change? Would widely shared pictures of catastrophic scenes raise awareness and improve preparedness for future events? Might concerned citizens pressure authorities to implement more effective climate crisis mitigation and adaptation measures?

I firmly believe that climate coverage deserves more newsroom resources. We need not just photographers whose works can capture attention and evoke compassion, but also photo editors and curators who can place these works in the right contexts. As writer Mark Feldman has stated, environmental photography must be paired with facts and narratives to serve as an effective form of advocacy.

But in China, journalism might no longer be the best avenue for engaging the public on climate change. Last year, after being forced to leave a disaster scene once again, I left Caixin Media, a renowned Chinese media group, to explore artistic storytelling. Art offers more diverse creative and aesthetic expressions and facilitates public engagement. For instance, displaying climate images across various platforms, from fine art galleries to neighborhood billboards, can help reach new audiences.

In 2023, I spent three months in Monthey, a small town in southern Switzerland, participating in an art residency that allowed me to create a series of works centered on glacial retreat. Twelve years earlier, it had been the photo exhibition “COAL + ICE,” a photo exhibition presenting the impacts of fossil fuels on glaciers and coal miners, that prompted me to become a photojournalist.

However, unlike its curators, Susan Meiselas and Jeroen de Vries, who transformed the project into an ongoing effort that documents experiences of vulnerable communities worldwide, I had very limited time – and resources – to present this urgent but relatively slow environmental process accelerated by climate change. Cultural and linguistic differences also challenged me to step out of my comfort zone to explore new perspectives in visual storytelling.

Inspired by Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung’s theories on myths and the collective unconscious, my multimedia works created a contemporary myth that depicts civilization’s vulnerability in facing climate change. I also combined scientific data, family photos, and landscape imagery to visualize the slow collapse of nature. 

I was struck by Monthey’s vibrant cultural scene and the strong sense of awareness and activism on climate change among its residents. From young to old, numerous strangers have offered me resources and inspiration that I couldn’t have imagined accessing as a journalist in China. For instance, the local theater offered accommodation and exhibition space; a writers’ association organized a workshop that brought locals together to share their memories of glacial experiences; and mountain guides and residents generously contributed their memories, family albums, and concerns about the glaciers.

This project has unfolded as an open process, incorporating diverse narrations, archives, and second-hand materials from many individuals. It is also sustainable, as it can continue to grow by inviting more contributions from various communities. It’s the kind of art project that the restrictions of photojournalism would never allow: it has allowed me to shift the power of narrative from my camera to the hands of those directly experiencing the impact of climate change – a method I intend to carry forward in my future artistic explorations.

In China, many independent artists are also working on projects related to the environment and climate. Among them, the best known is perhaps Nut Brother, a performance artist who has curated series projects to draw public attention to environmental pollution and social issues. However, without a developing support system – such as art funds, exhibitions, and publications dedicated to environmental issues – it’s challenging to attract broader engagement. Nevertheless, my experiences in Monthey have inspired me to envision the potential of art projects focused on climate change, a topic that remains largely unexplored in China.

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Shuang Tan is an independent initiative dedicated to tracking China’s energy transition and decarbonization. The newsletter is curated, written, and edited by Hongqiao Liu. 

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Yingzhi worked with both the private and public sectors in Europe, Asia, and North America to accelerate their climate and biodiversity ambitions, and previously served as the Deputy Director of the Green BRI Center at the Beijing-based International Institute of Green Finance, an internationally renowned Chinese think tank on sustainable finance.

In this article, Yingzhi offers a clear and insightful analysis of two market-based mechanisms that will impose a carbon price on both domestic and international aviation activities: China’s national Emissions Trading System (ETS) for domestic aviation, and the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) for international flights, which are not covered by the Paris Agreement.

While aviation’s absolute emissions appear almost negligible compared to other hard-to-abate sectors such as coal power, steel, and aluminum, the sector faces unique challenges. Decarbonization technologies are complex to develop and costly to deploy while the growing demand for air travel drives emissions to soar. This explains why, at the very beginning of the conception of a national ETS, China’s state planner National Development and Reform Commission identified aviation as one of the eight key industries to be included in the new carbon market.

Will the two carbon pricing schemes accelerate the decarbonization of China’s aviation sector? There is some positive evidence. As Yingzhi writes, pre-pandemic data from Guangzhou’s ETS pilot showed emissions declined despite rising activity levels.

However, as with all carbon pricing mechanisms, the devil is in the details. (In case you missed it: Simon Göß wrote an excellent reflection on carboneer’s experience of helping 30+ Chinese suppliers comply with the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.)

Implementing complex market-based regulations requires accurate emissions tracking, which can only be built on aviation companies’ enhanced carbon management capacities. To demonstrate genuine decarbonization efforts, they must also develop Paris-aligned transition plans, which, for now, are absent.

Moreover, truthful compliance, particularly with CORSIA, would require an entire support ecosystem. At a minimum, this means having capable carbon accounting service providers, adequate suppliers of high-quality carbon credits that uphold environmental and social integrity, and third-party certificate authorities that shield companies from fraud and greenwashing. 

Additionally, achieving deeper decarbonization in aviation will require increased investment in low-carbon technologies from both government and industry. While it may sound like a familiar refrain, many are pinning their hopes on Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) and China’s well-tested ability to scale up production.

The more important question is, as one of the world’s largest aviation emitters, can China drive the global efforts to reduce global aviation emissions?

I hope you enjoy this newsletter. Have a different perspective? Share your thoughts in the comments. If you’d like to write for Shuang Tan, republish our articles, or submit a testimonial, email us at contact@shuangtan.me.

Until next week,

Hongqiao

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Carbon Pricing, Chinese Aviation’s Inevitable Destination

Facing the dual pressures of integrating national and international carbon pricing programs, China's aviation industry must start acting now. 

By Yingzhi Sarah Tang

China is committed to carbon peaking by 2030. But with the country’s domestic and international travel forecast to increase, one sector is set to fly right past that deadline: aviation.

Flying is energy-intensive yet hard to decarbonize. The most promising solution in the near term – replacing petroleum-based jet fuels with Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) – faces cost and production constraints. Other abatement options, such as hydrogen and electric aircraft, are still in early development.

Today, the sector accounts for less than 1% of China’s total emissions.1 But emissions are set to grow given the country’s strong demand for air travel. The International Energy Agency has cautioned the country to “reconcile its ambition of developing its aviation industry with its climate policies.”

China’s aviation sector will soon need to comply with two carbon pricing mechanisms: the China national carbon market, where their domestic aviation activities will be regulated alongside high-emitting coal power, and the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), in which they must offset their emissions from international flights.

How will the two carbon pricing schemes impact the Chinese aviation sector? Can they accelerate sustainable aviation development and help China achieve its climate goals?

Domestic regime: China’s National ETS

Despite a negligible share, the aviation sector has been a focus of Beijing’s decarbonization agenda. It was one of eight sectors the National Development and Reform Commission, the state planner, decided to include in China’s national carbon emission trading scheme (ETS), alongside other notorious polluting sectors like coal power, steelmaking, and cement.

China’s ETS launched covering only the power sector. But as the carbon market celebrates its third anniversary, government and market stakeholders are accelerating the preparation for aviation’s inclusion.

Entering China’s national ETS could be a game changer for the aviation sector, pushing it to improve fuel efficiency while scaling up the adoption of low-carbon fuels.

Simply put, an ETS puts a price on carbon emissions and, therefore, incentivizes polluters to reduce emissions over time. The market-based mechanism allows abatement to happen where it is most cost-effective. Depending on the rulebook, entering the national ETS will bring down the aviation sector’s emission intensity, absolute emissions, or both.

Being part of an ETS will also shift the aviation sector’s approach to climate mitigation from buying carbon credits to voluntarily offset emissions, a gesture to show social responsibility, to prioritizing substantial emission reduction in its activities, an obligation to meet compliance constraints and manage carbon risks.

The EU ETS has successfully demonstrated such an impact. Since 2012, the carbon pricing scheme has led to 17 million tonnes of annual emission reduction from aviation activities within the European Economic Area (EEA), a drop of around 11%. As the EU ETS gradually phases out free allocation and transitions to full auctioning from 2026 onward, it will create even stronger incentives for the EU’s aviation sector to reduce their emissions.

Inside China, three ETS pilots in Guangdong, Shanghai, and Tianjin that cover the aviation sector have also delivered similar effects.

(To explore different carbon pricing mechanisms, China permitted eight regional pilots before officially introducing the national carbon market. Destined to be integrated into the national ETS, the regional pilots are currently running in parallel with the national market.)

For instance, the Guangdong pilot, which has covered domestic aviation since 2016, now includes four airlines, including China’s biggest – China Southern. Pre-pandemic data shows the covered airlines saw a 3.1% year-on-year emission reduction in 2018.

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International regime: CORSIA

While the timeline for entering the China national ETS remains unclear, it is certain that, starting in 2027, Chinese airlines will have to comply with another carbon pricing scheme – Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), an initiative of the UN agency International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Introduced in 2016, CORSIA is the world’s first regulatory, market-based mechanism specific to international aviation, an activity neglected by the Paris Agreement.

As China has gone global, Chinese airlines have emerged as major emitters in international aviation. Between 2015 and 2019, their aggregate emissions from international flights ranked third globally – although only reaching 40% of the levels of the United States.

Aspiring to foster sustainable growth in global civil aviation, the ICAO introduced a target in 2019, urging its member states to “achieve carbon-neutral growth from 2020 onwards.”

China, an ICAO member state, openly opposed the target, arguing it “goes at the expense of the legitimate rights to the development of developing countries and emerging market countries.”

CORSIA tackles airlines’ residual CO2 emissions after they have implemented various abatement measures, such as fuel efficiency improvements and SAF substitutions.2 Under CORSIA, airlines use eligible carbon credits, or “emissions units,” to offset any CO2 emissions above the baseline from international flights.

In practice, covered airlines must offset a given percentage of their CO2 emissions from international flights every year. From 2021 to 2032, this percentage only reflects the international aviation sector’s global average growth of emissions in a given year, known as the sector’s growth factor. From 2033 to 2035, an airline’s individual growth factor will determine 15% of its offsetting requirement.3

ICAO’s figure below illustrates how this percentage is calculated:

CORSIA is implemented in three phases:

China did not volunteer to participate in CORSIA’s Pilot Phase and First Phase. The Second Phase, however, is mandatory for all ICAO member states, including China.

Complying with CORSIA’s provisions would require major Chinese airlines to balance growing their international aviation while delivering long-term climate targets.

But with less than three years remaining before CORSIA enters the Second Phase, it is unclear how prepared Chinese airlines are. Even the “big three” – China Southern, China Eastern, and Air China – have yet to announce any public plans besides acknowledging that they are aware and will comply.

To ensure transparency, the ICAO introduced a mandatory Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) policy in 2018. Except for a few exemptions, all airlines had to start submitting their CO2 emissions from international flights in 2019, regardless of their current participation status. This should mean Chinese airlines have been submitting their emissions from international flights to ICAO for the past five years.

In 2018, CAAC, the Chinese regulator, introduced an interim measure on MRV, followed by a guide and a template in 2020. CAAC asks airlines to submit an annual CO2 emission report, which also covers their annual consumption of SAF. Chinese airlines supposedly comply with CAAC rules. Interestingly, this MRV requirement lays some groundwork for China’s national ETS.

While CORSIA poses a new compliance challenge to Chinese airlines, it also creates some opportunities for China’s carbon offset market. During the Pilot Phase, ICAO recognized certain carbon credits from China’s voluntary emission reduction scheme – China Certified Emission Reductions (CCERs).

However, CCERs are not included in the list of eligible credits for the First Phase. Should CCERs become eligible again – which is likely following the relaunch of CCERs in 2024 – the new international carbon offsetting scheme could attract international capital to support carbon reduction and removal activities inside China.

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The Path Forward 

The inevitable domestic and international carbon pricing regimes pressure the aviation sector in China to rethink its growth trajectory. For this hard-to-abate sector, it is a delicate balance between growing aviation activities, which stimulate the economy, and achieving carbon neutrality.

Due to the hard-to-abate nature of their activities, airlines typically purchase offsets from voluntary carbon markets as compensation rather than directly reducing their own emissions. The lack of fungibility – “a tonne is a tonne is a tonne” – in carbon offsets and oversight in the voluntary carbon markets have led to inconsistencies and fraud. 

Despite the controversies surrounding fraudulent practices and greenwashing allegations, offsetting remains a valid approach to compensate for emissions that cannot be cost-effectively abated with current technologies.

However, as a safeguard measure to limit the worst impacts of climate change, offsetting must come at the last of the mitigation hierarchy. In other words, companies must prioritize measures that avoid and mitigate their climate impacts along their value chain over offsetting. Many sustainability standards bodies, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project and the Science-Based Targets Initiative, have adopted this principle. 

To prepare for the regimes, multiple stakeholders can act now.

A robust MRV system is paramount to the success of both regimes. Regulators such as CAAC should periodically review and update the 2020 MRV guide and template, borrowing the latest good practices cited by ICAO and implemented in other jurisdictions such as the EU. To enhance transparency, CAAC and Chinese airlines can also launch a public and accessible emission data tracker.

Improving fuel efficiency and exploring the use of SAF, as mentioned in CAAC’s 14th Five-Year Green Development Plan, are immediate steps airlines can take. In its latest Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the Chinese government commits to support R&D of low-carbon aviation fuels. In China’s next NDC update, forthcoming in 2025, a quantitative target such as mandating SAF to be above a certain threshold in aviation fuel blend would catalyze more supply and demand.

A few Chinese biofuel companies are planning to trial SAF production. Government subsidies, similar to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the U.S. (which has approximately $3.3 billion in tax credits for SAF), will help SAF production to take off. Airlines can also commit long-term purchase agreements to provide market certainty.

In the long run, technologies will play a critical role in accelerating the low-carbon transition in aviation. For example, channeling public and private investment into R&D of new generations of low-carbon aircraft and advanced battery systems could unlock new emission reductions.

With the Second Phase on the horizon, Chinese airlines should start looking into the CORSIA-eligible crediting programs and methodologies to prepare for compliance. 

In principle, they should only purchase high-quality offsets from credible projects such as those with Core Carbon Principles labeling. They should also consider prioritizing offsetting projects inside China, such as afforestation, clean energy, and waste management projects to bolster climate and nature actions closer to home.

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Shuang Tan is an independent initiative dedicated to tracking China’s energy transition and decarbonization. The newsletter is curated, written, and edited by Hongqiao Liu. 

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