As promised, the Shuang Tan newsletter has returned. Beginning this week, we will publish one or more original articles each week. From commentary and explainer pieces to in-depth Q&A, we will explore various aspects of China’s energy transition and climate action.

Today’s edition, created in collaboration with Yuan Ye, a freelance writer based in China, presents a detailed analysis of a recent public interest lawsuit against a coal plant that reveals the complexities of climate litigation in China.

A central issue in this lawsuit is valuing the damages caused by carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. While it is scientifically agreed that greenhouse gases like CO2 cause climate change, determining a fair value for the damages to nature, the environment, and the climate in Chinese judicial practice remains an emerging challenge.

We learned that the plaintiff, a grassroots environmental group, and its legal team initially sought to use the prevailing trading price in China’s carbon market as a benchmark for damage compensation. However, the carbon price reflects the long-term reduction efforts within the policy framework in which the market operates. The cost of purchasing additional carbon emission allowances, although often mistakenly seen by corporations as merely the marginal cost of additional emissions, does not correspond to the economic value of the actual damage caused by emissions.

Are there alternative reference values, such as the cost of tree planting or direct carbon capture to remove carbon from the atmosphere? The challenges lie in the significant cost variations among these technical solutions. Should we also consider the costs of adapting to climate change? What about the broader impact on planetary health? 

But before delving into the specifics of calculating damage, the plaintiff faces a more immediate question: is it even possible to assess the climate impact of some 800,000 tons of CO2 when climate change mechanisms operate on a global scale?

Not to mention, anyone who attempts to advocate for immediate emission cuts in polluting industries in China will quickly find themselves hitting a wall, as carbon dioxide is not a legally regulated pollutant in China. 

China has been reluctant to set up an absolute cap on carbon emissions, despite its ambitious climate pledges and the high probability of achieving—or having achieved—an early peak. This approach has directly impacted the design of China’s ETS. The cap-and-trade system, which is about to celebrate its third anniversary in a few days, still lacks a cap for allowed emissions.

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China Court Rules in Favor of Climate Activists in Landmark Case Against Coal Plant

A grassroots NGO’s lawsuit against polluters highlights the difficulties of pricing climate damages and the obstacles faced by the nation's climate litigation efforts

By YUAN Ye

A regional court in China recently ruled in favor of climate activists in a lawsuit against a local coal power plant, marking a significant development as the country experiences increased legal claims against polluters and companies engaging in greenwashing.

The landmark ruling ordered Xingyi Shangcheng Power Generation Co., Ltd., a local coal power plant in Guizhou, southwestern China, to pay a 9,400 RMB ($1,295) fine for causing “ecological loss” and reprimanded the company for a public apology.

Grassland Alliance, a grassroots NGO based in Beijing that filed the case last year, celebrates it as the win of the first public interest lawsuit addressing China’s dual carbon climate goals. 

However, a closer look into the case shows that the court did not support the environmental group’s claim regarding the damages caused by the coal power plant’s excess carbon emissions.

Will the case usher in a new era of climate litigation in China?

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Noncompliance in the Carbon Market

The plant’s noncompliance with China’s newly introduced national carbon market is at the heart of the case. 

In 2021, China, the largest contributor to global carbon emissions, rolled out this market to enhance its control over greenhouse gas emissions. Today, this young market covers around 5.1 billion metric tons of annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from more than 2,000 thermal power plants across China. 

However, the world’s largest carbon market faces integrity concerns, with fraudulent data being one of the top challenges and noncompliance being the other. According to the plaintiff, the defendant “damages the environment” by churning out air pollutants and climate-warming CO2 and failing to offset its excess emissions as required by the emission trading system (ETS).

In 2021, the defendant exceeded its free emission allowance by producing an additional 818,148 tons of CO2. As of January 2022, a month after the completion of the implementation cycle, the defendant had only managed to surrender roughly 4% of its due from the excess emission.

But the court determined that the coal power plant had “no intentional delay.” According to the verdict, the plant “has almost lost its ability to meet its obligations” in the carbon market due to financial difficulties, a challenge shared by many Chinese coal power plants. Later, however, the defendant purchased sufficient permits to offset its deficit after the trial began.

Lin Qibei, a long-time environmental activist and consultant to the plaintiff, says that they hope to use this case to push corporations to “fulfill their climate responsibility.” The court supported this claim. The verdict states that the defendant has not “actively taken measures” to do its part in achieving China’s carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals.

Yet, Lin’s other wish—improving the transparency of China’s carbon market—appeared less evident to the court. As Lin deepens his understanding of carbon pricing, the environmental activist wants to see more evidence of how the new market promotes substantial mitigation actions.

As of December 2023, the total transactions in the China ETS surpassed 24.9 billion RMB ($3.4 billion), similar to the annual GDP of Djibouti in East Africa. 

“Lots of money flows in and out of the carbon market. Where did it go?“ says Lin.

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‘No Room’ to Discuss Climate Damages

Although the Guizhou court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the NGO has filed an appeal. The environmental activists hope that the higher court will recognize their crucial claim that the coal power plant is worsening the climate by emitting too many greenhouse gases.

In the national carbon market, power companies like the defendant receive an annual quota for their carbon emissions, which is currently allocated for free. They only incur costs when purchasing supplementary permits or carbon credits to offset their excess emissions.

One major point of contention in court is how to quantify the impact of emitting one ton of CO2, which presents a technical challenge and highlights a policy gap. Further complicating the situation is that CO2 is not yet considered a pollutant in China.

Wang Wenjing, a Beijing-based lawyer representing the plaintiff, despite his extensive experience in public interest suits on environmental issues, says the damage determination presents an unprecedented challenge for him and the court, with no precedent cases available for reference.

The regional court also finds it a difficult topic that requires broader consultation. The verdict reveals that Guizhou provincial and national environmental authorities weighed in on the issue, concluding that there is “no room for discussion” since CO2 is not classified as a pollutant and there are no specific legal grounds that limit its emissions.

Zhu Mingzhe, a lecturer in Just Transition at the University of Glasgow, acknowledges the difficulty of changing the tides with one small court case like this one. 

In contrast to the growing consensus in other regions, “people in China don’t see CO2 as causing pollution—either legally or in public perception,” says Zhu.

Despite their relative inexperience on climate issues, the plaintiff and its legal team are committed to pushing the boundary. The group has been actively seeking advice from legal experts and practitioners to identify feasible solutions to put a price tag on the damage. Their most recent inspiration is to demonstrate the health impacts on the local communities surrounding the plant.

“Even if the court fines the company just 1 yuan for emitting CO2, it would set an example for future cases,” says Wang.

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Potential with Conditions

According to a UN study, climate litigation has more than doubled since 2017. In China, efforts to strengthen climate change regulations through legal procedures have also grown.

Last year, China’s first climate lawsuit reached a historic settlement after seven years of legal battles. The defendant, State Grid Gansu, agreed to invest 900 million RMB ($124 million) to better support new energy consumption after being accused of violating a renewable energy law and causing wind and solar power curtailment.

The court has become an increasingly vital force in China’s multi-level climate campaign, experts say. An increasing number of lawsuits, primarily involving corporate disputes, have been filed in recent years as energy-intensive industries face stricter scrutiny under the government's carbon reduction policies. However, only a few of these cases have a strong climate component.

It appears that climate-related lawsuits may be gaining increasing support from the national judiciary. Last February, China’s Supreme People’s Court released its first guidance document on climate change cases. Experts expect the positive signal would encourage China’s public interest prosecutors to add climate cases to the thousands of environmental challenges they bring every year.

In an interview with Eco-Business last year, Dimitri de Boer from Client Earth stated that climate litigation now “has the potential” to drive China towards achieving its climate goals. 

“They [the lawsuits] have made local governments and businesses realize that environmental laws are just as important as other laws, and can't simply be ignored,” says De Boer in the Eco-Business interview.

Wang also believes that public interest litigation is an effective way to advance climate action in China, particularly in mobilizing corporate responsibility and ensuring accountability.

Zhu, the researcher, cautions that the room for confrontational legal action remains very limited in China compared to countries like the United States. According to the researcher, China’s top-down climate governance is “more about driving industrial upgrades” than “punishing polluters”. 

Today, only procuratorates and certain organizations qualified to file legal cases can initiate climate litigation in China. Zhu says that under the current legal framework, there is “basically no space” for individuals to challenge the government and major emitters.

As a result, climate activists in China are particularly prudent and tend to adopt a more strategic approach to combating climate inaction in court, according to Lin.

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In Chinese, we love to say “new year, new outlook.” For me, there’s no better way to kick off the new year of Dragon than with a cheerful announcement: In April 2024, Shuang Tan will resume regular publication, starting with a special series on climate finance. More details to come!

Last summer, I invited a few dozen leading experts working on the intersection of China and climate change to join me on a thought experiment. Together, we look for out-of-the-box thinking transcending short-term news cycles and our usual research, campaigning, and reporting routines about China and its decarbonisation.

The first part of the series was published in September 2023, outlining 100+ big questions on the outlook of China’s energy and climate action.

Today, I present the most interesting part of the exercise: twenty futuristic predictions on China’s decarbonisation journey. Ten is for the near term (1-3 years), and another ten is for the decade to come.

Please note that the experts were only prompted to share statements about the "possible future" based on their best knowledge. None of the individual participants should be held accountable for any of the synthesized predictions presented in this article.

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In Three Years…

PEAKING CARBON EARLY. China's carbon emissions will peak within 1-3 years, if not already. Emissions will linger at a plateau for a prolonged period, possibly over the next 3–5 years or even the next decade. However, pressured by economic recovery and energy security, high-emitting, harder-to-abate industries are likely to delay or increase their peak emission levels and postpone sector-wide carbon peaking.

EMISSION PATH DIVIDED The prediction of China’s emission trajectory following the carbon peak varies greatly, largely due to the divided assessment of the main drivers of the early peaking: economic downturns or systemic reforms. This raises questions about the future decarbonisation trajectory: Would China’s carbon peak be permanent or easily reversed over the next business cycle?

INTENSIFIED CATASTROPHES. Extreme weather events will become more frequent, amplify, and spread out of China, causing catastrophic consequences, including regular seasonal power rationing in megacities – a “new normal” – and rising death rolls resulting from ill-prepared climate adaptation and rigid urban planning and management.

RISING AWARENESS. Despite the de-emphasis on state propaganda, climate consciousness will rise among ordinary Chinese people as climate consequences intensify. But what's going to happen next? Some anticipate climate-driven public demands on the government and even motivate political activism, mirroring global trends.

FINANCIAL SHAKEUP. As China goes through a slow-burn financial shakeup, there will be scarcer capital for clean energy installations and manufacturing investments. The ripple effects may include a wave of closures and consolidations in clean energy industries, a weaker business case for clean energy investment, and even a reset in long-term growth expectations.

A MORE COSTLY REFORM. The national power market reform blueprint leaves many details to provincial authorities. This approach may result in increased storage and local backup (coal power) generation, impeding the efficient dispatch of variable renewables across broader geographic regions and leading to a more costly energy transition.

ETS EXPANSION. The world's largest carbon market by emission coverage, China's national carbon market, will eventually spread to other key emitting industries outside of power generation and soon integrate with the regional carbon markets. Nevertheless, not everyone shares the same belief in the effectiveness and efficiency of carbon pricing, particularly in the Chinese market, and more worry that the recently relaunched voluntary emission trading scheme will nourish corporate greenwashing due to “methodological flaws,” notably "factually dubious projects" in the ecosystem carbon sinks and incineration.

ACTIVATING PRIVATE FINANCE. China’s net-zero transition presents a trillion-dollar investment opportunity, and private finance will be a defining factor in the nation's pace of low-carbon transition. The obvious answers are better connections with regional and global financial markets and encouraging cross-border investment. But the extent of such financial endeavors hinges on Beijing's political choices, particularly on regulatory alignment and data transparency.

VOLUNTARY CLIMATE FINANCE. Hoping to stay in the developing country club and maintain its climate leadership, China is likely to pledge voluntary climate finance to support energy transition and climate adaptation in developing countries as part of Xi's climate pledge and in an effort to strengthen ties with the Global South.

GEOENGINEERING HOPE. Not a mainstream voice, but one expert predicts that China will launch another national research project on solar radiation modification (SRM, or solar geoengineering) and engage more actively with key players in global governance systems on geoengineering solutions. The rationale is that China, like any other country, must start to think about additional emergency options to manage climate risks.

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In Ten Years…

CHALLENGED SUPERPOWER. The climate crisis will evolve into the paramount international security issue of the next decade, and China will inevitably be drawn into the global food crisis and prolonged resource war. In the meantime, slower economic growth will undermine China's perceived global superpower status, affecting its geopolitical influence and introducing further ambiguities regarding China’s approach to international climate diplomacy.

NEW ENERGY SYSTEM. The energy system reform will start to yield some low-hanging fruit in the next 3-5 years, but more profound changes are only anticipated in the second half of the next decade, including reduced coal power usage (with average utilization drops to <2500hrs), a substantially larger contribution of renewable energy to the energy supply, widespread adoption of vehicle-to-grid technology, and the maturation of long-duration battery storage infrastructure.

GREEN HYDROGEN PUZZLE. Green hydrogen will ultimately find its place as a clean fuel substitute in harder-to-abate industries and long-distance heavy-duty vehicles. The fear, however, is that the most polluting industries, including steel and cement, could use it to postpone vital low-carbon expenditures over the course of the next ten years.

INDUSTRY DECARB COMPLEX. China's industrial decarbonisation is possibly driven more by structural changes in China's economy than specific climate policies. After a decade of catch-up, the harder-to-abate industries will start to meet current international best practices in clean production, such as incorporating alternative fuels in cement production.

DE-RISK TRADE-OFFS. As the US and EU’s efforts to reduce dependency on China intensify, supply chain diversification will bolster global market resilience and alleviate the risks of bottlenecks while bringing new environmental challenges. New mines will be opened, and new production lines will be installed outside of China, likely in nations with poor environmental governance.

DIGGING GREEN GOLD. China will continue evolving into an international green financing powerhouse, leading global innovation. However, this optimistic outlook is not without its challenges, including a progressively complex risk environment for investors and lingering interests in fossil fuels.

CARBON PRICING PUSH. The market mechanisms introduced in the 2020s will slowly mature over the next decade. The faith in China's carbon pricing initiatives is mixed: some hold skepticism about its nature as a “market mechanism,” while others bear modest optimism about carbon credits, notably in areas such as methane emission mitigation and carbon sequestration. It is worth noting that the lack of transparency and accountability will open new doors for greenwashing.

CCUS IN CROSSROAD. China will continue its investments in carbon removal technologies and may even take the lead in specific methods like DACCS and ocean-based removals. Nevertheless, the low carbon price is unlikely to drive significant adoption of CCUS in China's harder-to-abate industries, nor will CCUS grow into a major industry comparable to wind and solar due to limited domestic demand and near-zero export potential.

EVERYDAY SUSTAINABILITY. The next decade will witness “radical behavior changes” in everyday Chinese citizens, spurred by a surge in the sustainable food movement. The hope is that such revolutionary changes will also catalyze a growing sense of solidarity in climate action in and outside China.

(IN)JUST TRANSITION. Unless China undergoes profound socioeconomic transformation, it will likely witness a surge in inequality across various strata, particularly the underprivileged groups and less developed regions, as it contends with compounded domestic and international challenges. The aggravated social divisions naturally heighten concerns about possible domestic upheavals.

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Special thanks go to...

• CHEN Jiliang

• CHEN Zhibin

• Cory Combs

• Edmund Downie

• FENG Jing

• Anders Hove

• JIANG Yifan

• Kevin Li

• LI Yan

• Kate Logan

• Lauri Myllyvirta

• Belinda Schäpe

• Cecilia Springer

• XIE Chunping

• Echo Xie

• XIE Wenhong

• YUAN Ye

• ZHANG Shuwei

…and anonymous participants:

• Political Economist (US/China)

• Climate Tech Investor (China)

• Climate Philanthropist (China)

• Veteran Climate Activist (China/ASEAN)

• Senior Expert on ESG (China)

• Senior Consultant on Climate Governance (China/EU)

• Senior Consultant on Circular Economy (China/EU)

Support Shuang Tan

Shuang Tan is an independent initiative dedicated to tracking China’s energy transition and decarbonisation. 

Enjoy what you are reading? Pledge a subscription or buy me a coffee to show support.

Subscribe now

Buy Me A Coffee

Get in touch…

For feedback, inquiries, or funding opportunities, please write to contact@shuangtan.me. 

Complete the Reader Survey; help me make Shuang Tan 2.0 your go-to resource on China’s decarbonisation.

Till next time,

Hongqiao

Countless studies and op-eds were produced, and numerous panel discussions have been hosted since. But do we have all the necessary information and, more importantly, evidence to base our judgements on the world’s largest carbon emitter’s decarbonisation? Have we even been asking the right questions?

This summer, I invited a few dozen leading experts working on the intersection of China and climate change to join me on a thought experiment. Together, we look for out-of-the-box thinking that transcends short-term news cycles and our usual research, campaigning, and reporting routines about China and its decarbonisation.

In the first article of the three-part series, you will read about over a hundred questions posed by the leading China climate experts, including but not limited to:

• Climate politics in China

• Transparency and accountability

• Peaking coal and carbon emissions

• Development models

• Climate awareness

• Winners & losers in China’s decarbonisation

• “Global China” confronted with geopolitical turmoil

• Climate governance innovation

Support Shuang Tan

Shuang Tan is an independent initiative dedicated to tracking China’s energy transition and decarbonisation. 

Enjoy what you are reading? Pledge a subscription or buy me a coffee to show support.

Top of the list are questions about the politics of climate change in China. Ever since the new climate commitment, every “China climate watcher” has been asking themselves the same questions:

LEADERSHIP WILL. How much of China's climate commitment can be attributed to Xi's personal will? Should we worry about political fractions? Will the current leadership’s strong political will to tackle climate change stand in the next three decades?

POLITICAL CALCULUS. How does China view its own role in the environment and the climate crisis? Given that this personal aspect is undeniably crucial, what is Xi’s precise calculus? What are China's internally defined decarbonisation priorities and models for constructive multilateral support, rather than prescriptive external forces, to enable urgently needed emissions reductions?

CLIMATE MINISTRY. The Leaders Group on Carbon Peaking and Neutrality at the State Council level demonstrates the top leadership’s intention to coordinate the vertical and horizontal governance bodies, but such an ad hoc group, despite high-level political endorsement, does not address the fundamental governing obstacles, particularly scattered execution capacity and siloed policymaking. Will China set up a more powerful government body at the ministerial level?

But cracking the codes of the Chinese political language and comprehending the political landscape is not easy, even for experts in the field:

POLITICAL JARGON. New Development Philothopy, Ecological Civilisation, China’s Comprehensive View on Security... What do these terms actually mean? To what extent has such governing philanthropy been implemented—or not? 

THE ‘OTHER’ DRIVERS. What are the other domestic drivers for a deep and sustained low-carbon transition? Does civil society still have a place in the game? Is there any room for collective action from non-government actors?

As we enter the second half of the 14th five-year plan, questions about how the 2020 climate pledge is actually being implemented on the ground naturally arise:

NEW ENERGY SYSTEM. China has recently released its plans for the New Energy System. How will it deliver it? Is it actually possible to build a reliable energy system dominated by renewables for a large country like China? Can this New Energy System meet the demands of an increasingly electrified economy? When can China's renewables generate more electricity than coal-fired power plants? 

UNLOCK INVESTMENT. What are the primary obstacles to clean energy investment in China? To what extent can state intervention clear the obstacles? Can China sustain its clean energy investment as the investment-driven economic model comes to a head? How will the West-East division impact China’s clean energy development, particularly renewable energy and green hydrogen?

DRIVERS FOR THE CLEAN. What mix of internal economic, political, and social motivators and international cooperative frameworks could rapidly drive the adoption of renewables and phase out fossil fuels? What are the non-economic barriers to deep market reform and scaling up market-based policies, such as the carbon and power markets? Are green technology development and the dominance of global clean energy markets compelling domestic factors? Can climate disasters and public health provide pull?  

COWS AND CROPS. How will agriculture and soil play a role in China’s mitigation plan?  Will China’s agriculture sector ever become a carbon sink? Does China have plans to synergise its efforts on GHG emission reduction and nature conservation in the food system?

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Earlier, many research institutions anticipated that China would peak carbon emissions “before 2025” or “before 2027”. However, the ongoing economic downturn and the possible stimulus measures introduce new uncertainties to China's carbon peaking timeline:

CARBON PEAKING. To what extent can China's carbon peaking be attributed to structural reform in the economic sectors since the Copenhagen Conference, and how much is it merely an extended side effect of the economic downturns? 

PEAKING COAL. Can China peak its coal consumption around 2025? Will consumption rapidly decrease afterwards or rather stay high on the plateau? How will China manage stranded assets in the coal sector? Why do policymakers believe they need more coal for grid stability, and what could change their minds? Would China ever be willing to adopt a regional instead of provincial dispatch, and to what extent would that reduce the perceived need for more "baseload" power? Will the coal industry in China mount a more systemic counterattack against clean energy and/or CO2-peaking targets? 

The answer to the above question leads to more questions about China’s development model. The immediate economic challenges raise concerns about reverting to old growth-driven approaches at the expense of the environment:

NEW ECONOMIC NORMS.  Decarbonising China's economy requires a systemic transformation from the carbon-intensive nexus of construction and investment that it has relied upon since the late 2000s. How can China find a new growth model to break from this pattern? What will China's new economic paradigm look like once it recovers from the current downturn? As economists suggest China is leaning from an investment-led economic model to a consumption-led one, is there a place for consumption reduction, or “degrowth”, in China's decarbonisation?

DEVELOPMENT MODEL. What limits does climate change pose to China's own development? Does it have to resort to a non-capitalist development model, and what will be the social and political implications? Or does it compel China to follow other countries' capitalist models and outsource carbon to countries at the lower end of the global value chain? 

MAKING THE CASE FOR GREEN.  How we foster sustainable growth with the transition to net zero as the driving force? Is there really an economic case for the net zero transition in an increasingly inward-looking world dictated by news and election cycles, manipulated by powerful vested interests (commercially and socially), and mired in geopolitical rivalry? 

Now that rejuvenating declining economic performance has become the top priority, where does climate action now sit on the agenda?

PEAKED MOMENTUM? Climate action at the provincial and municipal levels appears to be further sidelined, particularly during the Covid lockdowns and in times of economic downturn. Had the political momentum for “Shuang Tan” also peaked alongside the country’s carbon dioxide emissions? Will decarbonisation targets be further sidelined to make way for short-term priorities, particularly on economic development and national security？

OVERSHOOTING 1.5°C. The world is evidently off track to meet the 1.5/2°C target set in the Paris Agreement. How does China plan to deal with the consequences of overshooting the 1.5°C threshold, which may happen in the next 2-3 years? Will China consider raising its climate ambitions any time soon against the backdrop of slow economic growth? 

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What will come after coal and carbon peaking? The country is at the starting line of its three- to four-decade-long decarbonisation journey. How to hold its climate pledge accountable? Transparency is key.

EMISSION DATA. Why hasn’t China updated its National Emission Inventory? What is the most reliable and current CO2 and non-CO2 emission data in China? Do city-level emission databases produced by Chinese scholars reflect reality? Does China plan to address the lack of transparency in its emission data? Will China introduce third-party auditing for its national emission inventory? 

MEASURING PROGRESS. Is the low-carbon energy transition on track? How do we measure the annual progress? What are the next milestones to assess China's decarbonisation progress after carbon peaking? Will Gross Ecological Product (GEP), an indicator measuring the value of nature's contribution to human well-being, ever become influential in China's economic and environmental governance? 

How do Chinese people think about climate change? Indeed, the voices and actions of non-state stakeholders in China are much scarcer in international media coverage or research reports.

ClIMATE AWARENESS.  Are there climate sceptics and deniers in China, or are the majority of Chinese “climate neglecters”? Do Chinese people, particularly the younger generations, care about climate change? Why do they care? Is this because of a deemed national strategy or concerns over their own fates? What are the effective strategies to raise climate awareness among ordinary Chinese people and channel their awareness into action?

CLIMATE ANXIETY. Do Chinese people, particularly the youth, share similar climate anxiety as observed in the West and the South? Is climate anxiety a contributing factor to China's slumping birth rate? Will it be one day? 

CLIMATE EDUCATION. How do Chinese people learn about climate change? Has climate science and the socio-economics of climate change been embedded in the syllabus of compulsory education? Is climate education, such as exploitation tours in Antarctica or Shangri-la, reserved for social elites and their offspring? Chinese universities are setting up dozens of new climate institutions named after the “Shuang Tan” pledge. What does this mean for climate education in China?

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Sadly, 'just transition' in China wasn't a popular topic in technocrat-dominated discussions on transforming the carbon-intensive energy system or quickly deploying cutting-edge clean technologies. But who are the faces of the transition? Beyond the dollar value of transition costs or adaptation burdens, who are the people actually bearing the consequences of climate inaction?

WINNERS–LOSERS. Is China’s climate adaptation plan adequate for the disastrous consequences that the country has been experiencing, from extreme heat to floods across the country? Who is benefiting from the clean economy boom? Who gets hit the most? Who will be sacrificed in the long run? What’s China’s plan for coal workers and the communities and regions heavily reliant on coal? 

EQUIBLE TRANSITION. Will the clean transition deepen existing social injustices, such as domestic violence, occupational diseases, and inequitable income distribution? Does China recognise the opportunity provided by the clean transition to advance social justice? Has China taken substantial actions to level up marginalised groups who are most affected by the energy transition? Will it? How can financial innovation play a role in fostering an equitable transition? How do we hold "greenwashers" accountable? 

ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES. Will China introduce the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle in its domestic climate legislation and address the differentiated historical contribution to climate change and mitigation capacity across provinces and sectors? 

CLIMATE NEXUS. How will China deliver its climate pledge while addressing energy and food security challenges, considering that solutions to the latter shouldn’t compromise climate actions? Has China’s energy planners fully considered the impact of climate change on its energy system, particularly changing water patterns for coal, solar, and nuclear energy? Has China exhausted the cost-benefit of “clean coal” since the air pollution campaign in the 2010s? 

What are the consequences of the current geopolitical turmoil? Where are we heading? What do de-risking, trade wars, “new cold wars”, and armed conflicts mean for the global climate agenda? How about peacemaking through climate action?

CLIMATE COOPERATION. Is China-US/-EU climate cooperation still possible in a much more intensified geopolitical competition? What could break the stalemate holding back China-US climate cooperation? What are the best venues to engage China in climate diplomacy if the usual intergovernmental and civil society tracks are no longer efficient and effective? Shall we prepare for a scenario in which China withdraws from the multilateral climate process?

GREENER SUPPLY CHAIN. Given that China won’t disappear from the global clean energy supply chain, what are the venues to improve Chinese actors' social, environmental, and governance (ESG) performance? What safeguards must be implemented to ensure the critical minerals produced in China or elsewhere are responsibly sourced socially and environmentally? What are the exit plans for supply chain dependency on China when exposures to ESG risks become inevitable and unabatable?

CONFLICT ESCALATION. Should the tensions around Taiwan or China's other claims escalate into a conflict, among other things, how will they impact the global clean energy supply chains? How will the escalated conflicts between China, China's neighbouring countries, and "the West" derail global progress on climate change and its own at home? Could decarbonisation possibly act as a stepping stone for peace?

How do we unlock the information black box in China? How do we enrich our toolbox? How do we maintain the narrowing venues of engagement so that we can “help”, “engage”, “incentivise”, or “collaborate” with China to accelerate climate action—or, shall we adopt new alternative solutions?  

GLOBAL CHINA. How can China contribute to accelerating the global energy transition? How can China support vulnerable countries in adapting to climate change? What is China's role in transforming the international financial system to align with climate targets? Is China building “green soft power”? Is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) getting greener or silently dying out? How can international climate finance and technology transfer be facilitated without appearing coercive? 

EXTERNAL INFLUENCE.  What are the most effective ways for the international community to accelerate China's transition, given its strong desire to follow its own path and resistance to foreign influence? Do external factors, such as geopolitical dynamics, still have an influence on Chinese policymaking? Can a science-based international consensus possibly override the nationalistic overtones? 

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Special thanks go to...

• CHEN Jiliang

• CHEN Zhibin

• Cory Combs

• Edmund Downie

• FENG Jing

• Anders Hove

• JIANG Yifan

• Kevin Li

• LI Yan

• Kate Logan

• Lauri Myllyvirta

• Belinda Schäpe

• Cecilia Springer

• XIE Chunping

• Echo Xie

• XIE Wenhong

• YUAN Ye

• ZHANG Shuwei

…and anonymous participants:

• Political Economist (US/China)

• Climate Tech Investor (China)

• Climate Philanthropist (China)

• Veteran Climate Activist (China/ASEAN)

• Senior Expert on ESG (China)

• Senior Consultant on Climate Governance (China/EU)

• Senior Consultant on Circular Economy (China/EU)

Coming up…

Want to hear how the leading China climate experts respond to the challenging questions? Stay tuned for the next article in the three-part series.

In the third article, we will look into the future: What will China’s climate landscape look like in one, three, and ten years?

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Get in touch…

For feedback, speaking invitations, or funding opportunities, please write to contact@shuangtan.me. 

Complete the Reader Survey; help me make Shuang Tan 2.0 your go-to resource on China’s decarbonisation.

Till next time,

Hongqiao

• Has China’s “Green Movement” come to an end, or has it reinvented itself in new forms?

• Does China’s “Shuang Tan” climate pledge offer an exceptional opportunity for green activism?

• Are Chinese millennials “New Farmers” and “new villagers,” as well as urban youth’s efforts to build “nearby” and live green lifestyles, incubating new waves of the green movement in China?

Our conclusion:

• China’s Green Movement, exemplified by the “Nu (Salween) River Anti-Dam Campaign” and the “Xiamen PX Protest,” is unlikely to reappear in the near future. However, China’s civil society groups and individuals are still working creatively to promote environmental public welfare.

• A decade after the initial wave of active climate action before the CoP15 Copenhagen, China's new climate commitment in late 2020 sparked a second wave of widespread enthusiasm in the public and private sectors. However, there has been a substantial shift in the driving force, as China’s civil society today plays a considerably smaller role.

• The scarcity of opportunities to re-engage with public life has compelled people to turn their attention inward, focusing on their personal lives and creating safe cacoons. “New farmers” and “New Villagers” and the popular thinking of “rediscovering the nearby” in urban China represent the rapidly altering values of the social elites in Millennials and Generation Z; yet, this does not necessarily mean regression.

In addition, we discussed the shifting strategies and focal areas of Chinese environmental NGOs over the past decade, as well as broader reflections on the "Green Movement."

The interviewee, who remains an active member of Chinese civil society, explained their reasons for choosing to remain anonymous at the end of the interview.

This interview is exclusively distributed to paid subscribers.

In the next issue, I will join some of the most astute analysts and observers of #China and #climate issues to examine the subsequent milestones of China's energy transition and climate action after the country reaches peak carbon in the next year or two. Stay tuned.

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